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INTRODUCTION 
This Article focuses on the following question: Is Secularism a 
Non-Negotiable Principle? The place of secularism, or alternatively 
of religion, in society and within the constitutional order has 
certainly been a central topic for the study of constitutionalism.1 I
approach the question from a different and narrower perspective; that 
of “constitutional unamendability.” The term constitutional 
unamendability refers to the resistance of certain constitutional 
principles to their amendment or revision through formal 
constitutional amendments.2
In many states, national constitutions entrench constitutional 
principles in a way that restricts or prohibits any amendment to them. 
Nowadays, such constitutional protection is even enforced in some 
states through substantive constitutional review of constitutional 
amendments in order to ensure that the amendment power does not 
1. See generally Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal 
Democracy: The Establishment Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective,
88 MARQUETTE L. REV. 867 (2005). For various studies and perspectives, see 
Symposium, Constitutionalism and Secularism in an Age of Religious Revival: The 
Challenge of Global and Local Fundamentalisms, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2331 
(2009). 
2. See Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the 
United States, 67 SUP. CT. L. REV. 181, 182-90 (2014). There has been an increasing 
volume of literature on constitutional unamendability lately. See, e.g., id.; George 
Mader, Binding Authority: Unamendability in the United States Constitution—A
Textual and Historical Analysis, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 841 (2016); AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTION? UNAMENDABILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACIES (Richard Albert & Bertil Emrah Oder eds., forthcoming 2018). 
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exceed its limits.3 Perhaps the most famous example of constitutional 
unamendability is Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) of 1949. Written against the background of the 
experience of the Weimar Constitution and the Holocaust, Article 
79(3) prohibits constitutional amendments affecting the division of 
the Federation into states (Länder), human dignity, the constitutional 
order, and basic institutional principles describing Germany as a 
democratic and social federal state.4 This provision is commonly 
referred to as “the Eternity Clause” (die Ewigkeitsklausel), and 
following the German jargon, the terminology of “eternity” to 
describe such protected provisions spread in the constitutional 
3. See, e.g., KEMAL GÖZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2008); Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV. 321 (2011); Carlos Bernal, 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: An 
Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement 
Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339 (2013); Gábor Halmai, Judicial Review of
Constitutional Amendments and New Constitutions in Comparative Perspective, 50 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 951 (2015); Gábor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments: Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Constitution?, 19
CONSTELLATIONS 182 (2012); Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional 
Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 460 (2006); Rory 
O’Connell, Guardians of the Constitution: Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms, 4 
J. CIV. LIBERTIES 48 (1999); Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments—The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP.
L. 657 (2013); Po Jen Yap, The Conundrum of Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments, 4 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 114 (2015).
4. See Helmut Goerlich, Concept of Special Protection for Certain 
Elements and Principles of the Constitution Against Amendments and Article 79(3), 
Basic Law of Germany, 1 NUJS L. REV. 397, 398 (2008); Ulrich K. Preuss, The 
Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 
440 (2011).
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literature.5 Others have described such provisions as an “absolute 
rigidity,”6 “indefinite entrenchment,”7 or “unamendable provisions.”8
The concept of “eternity” has been explored widely already in 
medieval philosophy; mainly since infinity and supra-temporality 
notions were regularly ascribed to God.9 On later periods, even 
referring to the constitution—the fundamental law of the land—as 
having an eternal character is also not unheard of. When John Locke
wrote “‘The Fundamental Constitution’ of the colony of Carolina in 
1669,” he stipulated that it “shall be and remain the sacred and 
unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever.”10 I
have elsewhere written that such a treatment of the entire 
constitutional document as unamendable may derive either from the 
drafters of the constitution being exceptionally arrogant in the belief 
that they have achieved the apex of perfection or from assigning the 
document to a super-human or divine source.11 It is precisely the 
latter alternative that is so striking when one thinks of the 
constitutional entrenchment of secularism. Secularism rejects notions 
of a divine authority, yet at the same time, the designation of 
5. See, e.g., Christoph Bezemek, Constitutional Core(s): Amendments, 
Entrenchments, Eternities and Beyond Prolegomena to a Theory of Normative 
Volatility, 11 J. JURIS. 517 (2011); Andrew Friedman, Dead Hand 
Constitutionalism: The Danger of Eternity Clauses in New Democracies, 4 
MEXICAN L. REV. 77 (2011); Silvia Suteu, Eternity Clauses in Post-Conflict and 
Post-Authoritarian Constitution-Making: Promise and Limits, 6(1) GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 63 (2017); Ladislav Vyhnánek, The Eternity Clause in the 
Czech Constitution as Limit to European Integration—Much Ado About Nothing?, 9 
VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 240 (2015); Sharon Weintal, The Challenge of 
Reconciling Constitutional Eternity Clauses with Popular Sovereignty: Toward 
Three-Track Democracy in Israel as a Universal Holistic Constitutional System and 
Theory, 44 ISR. L. REV. 449 (2011).
6. Dag Anckar, Notes on Constitutional Endurance, 5 BEIJING L. REV. 80, 
86 (2014).
7. Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 672, 
678 n.42 (2010) (mentioning there also “absolute entrenchment”).
8. Yaniv Roznai, Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the 
Constitution, 27 EUR. REV. PUB. L. 775 (2015).
9. For an excellent exploration of eternity in Medieval Philosophy, see 
Taneli Kukkonen, Eternity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 
525 (John Marenbon ed., 2012). For an elaboration on the conceptualization of time 
in antiquity, see RICHARD SORABJI, TIME, CREATION AND THE CONTINUUM: THEORIES 
IN ANTIQUITY AND THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (1983). 
10. JOHN LOCKE, THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 198 (12th ed.1824).
11. YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS:
THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS 16 (2017). A similar point is made by 
Levinson. Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 
CONST. COMM. 107, 112-13 (1996). 
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secularism as an eternal principle itself abandons the idea of a 
secular law—changeable by nature—shifting to the realms of the 
transcendent.
This Article seeks to study the eternal protection of the 
principle of secularism in national constitutions. Now, as the sharp 
reader noticed, in the opening paragraph, I did not ask whether 
secularism ought to be a non-negotiable principle, but rather whether 
it is one. In other words, this is not a normative inquiry. The aim of 
this Article is therefore fairly modest; I wish to examine actual 
existing constitutional arrangements that prima facie provide 
secularism an absolute protection from change in the constitution, in 
an attempt to identify and explain the character of these existing 
constitutional arrangements. Thus, this is another attempt to 
understand constitutionalism as a form of political practice, and to 
evaluate how this practice works against its own logic.12
Part I of this Article discusses secularism as an Eternal 
Constitutional Principle. It reviews various constitutions that 
entrench secularism as an implicit or explicit principle. Part II 
explains why constitutional eternity should not be regarded as if the 
protected constitutional principles are non-negotiable. This is 
demonstrated through three case studies that focus on Turkey, 
Tajikistan, and Mali. Against the backdrop of these case studies, I 
argue that eternal principles should be regarded as negotiable on 
three main grounds. First, as long as eternity clauses are not self-
entrenched, they can be formally amended. Second, what is protected 
by the eternity clauses is a constitutional principle—secularism 
rather than a rule. In light of its elastic meaning, the principle of 
secularism can therefore be reshaped and reinterpreted with time. 
Third, when the values protected by constitutional unamendability 
conflict with the community spirit or the Volksgeist, even the 
mechanism of constitutional eternity would not be able to hinder the 
true forces in society that demand change. Part III addresses what I 
term “the Circle of Eternity.” It demonstrates the central place of 
eternity in religious laws and natural law, an element that 
distinguishes them from secular law. It then describes the secular 
developments in the age of rationalization in order to finally reveal 
the self-contradiction of modern constitutional eternity. On the one 
12. Other scholars have taken a similar approach. Cf. Martin Loughlin, 
Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, in 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
183, 186 (2005); STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN DELIBERATION 2 (2012). 
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hand, the basic fundamentals of modern constitutionalism are 
secular, from the standing point of popular sovereignty and people’s 
rational ability to decide their faith, destiny, and consequently, to 
design their constitutional order. Yet, at the same time, this very 
presupposition rests as an unalterable pillar—an absolute truth that is 
the constitutional eternity. 
I. SECULARISM AS AN ETERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
This Part studies the absolute constitutional entrenchment of 
the principle of secularism in constitutions. It first reviews 
constitutions in which secularism is explicitly protected as an 
unamendable or eternal principle; i.e., as a constitutional principle 
that is expressly shielded from formal constitutional amendments. It 
then continues to review constitutional systems in which courts have 
declared the principle of secularism to be implicitly protected from 
amendments, focusing on India and Italy. 
A. Secularism as an Explicit Eternal Principle
Historically, there is a strong link between constitutional 
eternity and notions of secularism, as the early modern examples of 
constitutional unamendability protected separation between state and 
church. This occurred first in North America in the eighteenth 
century. The 1776 Constitution of New Jersey specified in Article 23 
that members of the Legislative Council or House of Assembly had 
to take an oath not to “annul or repeal” the articles opposing church 
establishment and conferring equal civil rights on all Protestants.13
Likewise, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 prohibited in Article 30 
amendments to the prohibition on establishing any one religious 
sect.14
Of course, many states declare or define themselves as 
“secular” or protect in their constitutions the separation between the 
13. N.J. CONST. art. XXIII. 
14. DEL. CONST. art. XXIX. This Article provides: 
There shall be no establishment of any one religious sect in this State in 
preference to another; and no clergyman or preacher of the gospel, of 
any denomination, shall be capable of holding any civil office in this 
State, or of being a member of either of the branches of the legislature, 
while they continue in the exercise of the pastoral function.
Id.
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state and religious institutions.15 However, some modern 
constitutions have taken this constitutional protection to its extreme 
and, like the early examples of New Jersey and Delaware, provide 
the “secular” nature of the state or the principle of “separation 
between the state and churches” an absolute entrenchment in the 
constitution, protecting them from possible amendments or 
revisions.16 These states elevate these enshrined principles above 
ordinary and even constitutional politics, designating them as 
principles that cannot be amended or abolished; they are beyond the 
reach of the constitutional amendment power. 
The Constitution of Portugal of 1976, for example, states in 
Article 288(c) that “[t]he laws revising the Constitution [must] 
safeguard . . . The separation between church and State.”17 Likewise, 
the 2013 Constitution of the Central African Republic expressly 
excluded in Article 101 from revisions the republican and secular 
state form.18 Such a supreme constitutional protection appears also in 
Angola,19 Burundi,20 Chad,21 the Republic of Congo,22 Côte 
d’Ivoire,23 Guinea,24 Mali,25 São Tomé and Príncipe,26 Tajikistan,27
15. See, e.g., KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 14 (Russ.) (“The Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No 
religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion. Religious 
associations shall be separated from the State and are equal before the law.”); 
MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], 
ALAPTÖRVÉNY (“The State and Churches shall be separate. Churches shall be 
autonomous.”); CONSTITUTION OF KOSOVO, art. VIII (2008) (“The Republic of 
Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs.”); 
CONSTITUTION OF LATVIA, art. XCIX (1922) (“The church shall be separate from the 
State.”).
16. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
17. CONSTITUTION OF PORTUGAL 1976, art. 288(c).
18. CONSTITUTION OF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 2013, art. 101.
19. CONSTITUTION OF ANGOLA, art. 236(g) (2010) (“The secular nature of 
the state and the principle of the separation of church and state.”).
20. CONSTITUTION OF BURUNDI, art. 299 (2005) (“No procedure of revision 
may be retained if it infringes the national unity, the cohesion of Burundian People, 
the secularity of the State, the reconciliation, the democracy or the integrity of the 
territory of the Republic.”).
21. CONSTITUTION OF CHAD, art. 223 (1996) (“No procedure of revision 
may be engaged or pursued when it infringes . . . the republican form of the State, 
the principle of the separation of powers and secularity . . . .”).
22. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO, art. 240 (2015) (“No 
procedure of revision may be engaged or pursued in [an] interim period or when it 
infringes the integrity of the territory. The republican form, and the secular character 
of the State may not be made the object of revision.”).
23. CONSTITUTION OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE 2000, art. 127 (“No procedure of 
revision may be undertaken or pursued if it infringes on the integrity of the territory. 
260 Michigan State Law Review 2017
Togo,28 and Turkey.29 This unamendability protection is therefore a 
central feature of constitutional design that demands scholarly 
attention.
It appears evident from the above list that many African states 
that include this “eternal protection” are former French colonies.30 It 
is indeed interesting to point to the relationship between colonialism 
and religions, especially Islam. A recent study demonstrates that no 
country in the French colonial tradition has adopted a constitutional 
repugnancy clause, according to which all laws repugnant to Islam 
are void.31 In contrast, countries that were colonized by the British 
have a relatively high degree of constitutional Islamization. It 
therefore appears that by including this unamendability, they aim to 
follow laïcité—the French concept of secularism.32
The republican form and the secular [form] of the State may not be made the object 
of a revision.”).
24. CONSTITUTION OF GUINEA 2010, art. 154 (“The republican form of the 
State, the principle of secularity, the principle of the uniqueness of the State, the 
principle of the separation and of the equilibrium of the powers, the political and 
syndical pluralism, [and] the number and the duration of the mandates of the 
President of the Republic[,] may not be made the object of a revision.”).
25. CONSTITUTION OF MALI 1992, art. 118 (“No procedure of revision can 
be initiated or pursued when it infringes the integrity of the territory. The republican 
form and the secularity of the State as well as [regime of] plural-parties cannot be 
the object of revision.”). 
26. CONSTITUTION OF SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE 1975, art. 154(b) (providing 
that “[t]he secular status of the State” is not subject to constitutional revision).
27. CONSTITUTION OF TAJIKISTAN 1994, art. 100 (“The republican form of 
government of, the territorial integrity of, and the democratic, rule of law, secular, 
and social natures of the state may not be changed.”).
28. CONSTITUTION OF TOGO 1992, art. 144 (“The Republican form and the 
secularity of the State may not be the object of revision.”).
29. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY Oct. 18, 1982, art. 4 (“The 
provision of Article 1 regarding the form of the State being a Republic, the 
characteristics of the Republic in Article 2, and the provisions of Article 3 shall not 
be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed.”). According to Article 2, the 
Republic of Turkey is a secular state. See id. art. 2.
30. These are Togo, Mali, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of Congo, 
Chad, and the Central African Republic. On the influence of colonial power on legal 
systems, see Daniel M. Klerman et al., Legal Origin or Colonial History?, 3 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 379, 380 (2011).
31. See Dawood I. Ahmed & Moamen Gouda, Measuring Constitutional 
Islamization: The Islamic Constitutions Index, 38 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
1, 55 (2015). 
32. On the French notion of laïcité, see Jean-Paul Costa, La Conception 
Française De La Laïcité, 149 REVUE DES SCIENCES MORALES ET POLITIQUES 167 
(1994) (Fr.) (describing the formation of laïcité in the 19th century as a reaction 
against the power of the Catholic Church and the dogma of papal infallibility, its 
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Now, there is no doubt that in France, secularism is a 
fundamental and explicit constitutional principle.33 This raises an 
interesting question: Is laïcité an unamendable principle in France, 
like in the former French colonies mentioned above? The 1958 
French Constitution includes an eternity clause, Article 89, according 
to which “[t]he republican form of government shall not be the 
object of any amendment.”34 Therefore, it does not explicitly refer to 
secularism. Notwithstanding this absence, many view the principles 
of secularism as protected by Article 89 based upon the importance 
of laïcité to the French conception of republicanism.35 According to 
this approach, to generate allegiance to the republic and to maintain 
unity, the state must monitor religion and regulate the corporate 
organization of religious groups.36 Indeed, the principle of laïcité was 
interpreted by the Conseil Constitutionnel as precluding “the use of 
development and the challenges to his concept posed by immigration and the 
increasing power of religions); Michel Troper, Sovereignty and Laïcité, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2561, 2563 (2009). Troper states:
Laïcité cannot be completely defined by the usual idea of an absence of 
influence of religion on the State or, as it is sometimes said, by a
separation between State and religion. But it can also be characterized 
as an attitude of the State towards religion, decided unilaterally by the 
State. Indeed, most authors, when defining laïcité, use other characters, 
such as freedom of religion, tolerance or neutrality. Thus, they 
characterize not a mutual attitude or the relationship between religion 
and the State, but only the attitude of the State towards religion, because 
even the decision not to interfere with religious matters is a sovereign 
decision.
Id.
33. See András Sajó, Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for 
Public Reason, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2401, 2404 (2009).
34. 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.). 
35. See, e.g., Philippe Ardant, La Laïcité—Introduction, 75 POUVOIRS,
REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ÉTUDES CONSTITUTIONNELLES ET POLITIQUES 5, 5 (1995) (Fr.) 
(stating that secularism is one of the founding principles of the state, as a republican 
value); Alain Bergounioux, La Laïcité, Valeur de la République, 75 POUVOIRS,
REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ÉTUDES CONSTITUTIONNELLES ET POLITIQUES 17, 17 (1995) 
(Fr.) (describing laïcité as a fundamental republican principle). 
36. See generally Michel Troper, Republicanism and Freedom of Religion 
in France, in RELIGION, SECULARISM & CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 316 (Jean L. 
Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds., 2016). As Eoin Daly explains, “laïcité, formalist 
equality and indivisibility all coalesce around a single republican doctrine, affirming 
the singularity of the French people, understood as an abstract and disembodied 
corpus of citizens whose juridical status is defined independently of their contingent 
characteristics, beliefs and origins.” Eoin Daly, The Indivisibility of the French 
Republic as Political Theory and Constitutional Doctrine, 11 EUR. CONST. L. REV.
458, 476 (2015). 
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religious beliefs as a criterion through which to gain exemption from 
rules governing the relationship between private individuals and 
public entities.”37 According to the republican logic, the idea of 
religious communities releasing themselves from general and neutral 
legislation undermines citizenship and the indivisibility of the 
republic.38 A support for the claim that laïcité is included within the 
French unamendable provision one may find in Article 1 of the 
Constitution that states that “France shall be an indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social Republic.”39 Laïcité thus figures in the first 
article that describes what republicanism—which is unamendable on 
the basis of Article 89—means in France. Consequently, it is 
certainly plausible to argue that the principle of laïcité itself is 
unamendable.40 Certainly in public discourse, laïcité is understood as 
an integral part of republicanism. 
On the other hand, there is a counter textual argument. Article 
89(5) does not refer to republicanism as such, but rather to “the 
republican form of government” more narrowly.41 While this is 
certainly open to interpretation, arguably this form of government 
does not include Church–State relations. The Law Concerning the 
Separation of the Churches and the State, which established the 
secular character of the French state, banning state funding for 
religious activities and removing religious symbols from public 
37. See Daly, supra note 36 (citing Conseil constitutionnel [CC] 
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2004-505DC, Nov. 19, 2004 (Fr.)). 
38. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 
2004-505DC, Nov. 19, 2004 (Fr.).
39. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.).
40. Compare this to the early jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court and its broad interpretation of the unamendable provision. Article Nine of the 
1961 Constitution stipulated that “[t]he provision of the Constitution establishing the 
form of the state as a republic shall not be amended nor shall any motion therefor be 
made.” CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 1961, art. 9. The Turkish 
Constitutional Court has held that “what is deemed unamendable is not the word 
‘Republic’, but the Republican regime with its characteristics as stipulated in the 
Constitution”, thereby expanding the unamendable protection to the characteristics 
of the republic as stipulated in Article 2, such as “nationalistic, democratic, secular 
and social state governed by the rule of law, based on human rights.” See Tarik 
Olcay, Unamendability of Amendable Clauses: The Case of the Turkish 
Constitution, in AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTION? UNAMENDABILITY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2 (citing Turkish Constitutional Court 
E. 1970/1, 322).
41. 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.). 
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buildings, was only promulgated in 1905.42 Thus, until 1905 a 
“republic” coexisted with religious establishment.
When the “republican” form of government was designated as 
an unamendable principle in 1884, its original aim was to express a 
strong repudiation of Monarchism.43 Of course, nowadays if one 
considers this protection of the “republican” form of government as 
narrowly meaning merely not a return to the monarchy, this would 
eventually amount to saying that there are no substantive limits on 
the amendment power in the constitution.44 In any event, nowadays 
the question is purely a discursive one, without real legal 
implications. This is because the Conseil Constitutionnel took a 
rather restrained position regarding the unamendability45 when it 
laconically declared in 2003 that it lacks any competence to conduct 
judicial review of constitutional amendments; i.e., to rule on the 
content of “republican form of government” as protected in Article 
89(5).46
B. Secularism as an Implicit Eternal Principle 
The previous section described the constitutional phenomenon 
of states that provide an expressed constitutional protection from 
amendments to the principle of secularism or the separation between 
42. See Loi Concernant la Séparation des Églises et de l’État, J. OFFICIEL 
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, Dec. 11, 1905, 7205 (Fr.). For a brief review of the 
history of the relationship between state and church in France, see Ioanna 
Tourkochoriti, The Burka Ban: Divergent Approaches to Freedom of Religion in 
France and in the U.S.A., 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 791, 800-01 (2012).
43. On how constitution-drafters use unamendable provisions for 
expressing certain constitutional values and political commitments, see generally
Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 
MCGILL L.J. 225 (2013). 
44. See ROZNAI, supra note 11, at 213; Carl J. Friedrich, The New French 
Constitution in Political and Historical Perspective, 72 HARV. L. REV. 801, 812 
(1959).
45. See Susan Wright, The Self-restraint of the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel in 2003 and 2004, 11 EUROPEAN PUB. L. 495, 495 (2005); Denis 
Baranger, The Language of Eternity: Judicial Review of the Amending Power in 
France (or the Absence Thereof), 44 ISR. L. REV. 389, 391 (2011).
46. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2003-
469DC, Mar. 26, 2003 (Fr.). This is in contrast with an early decision in which the 
Conseil Constitutionnel specified that, subject to the temporal and substantive 
restrictions provided in the Constitution, the constituent power is sovereign. Conseil 
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 92-312DC, Sept. 2, 1992 
(Fr.). From this statement, it was clear that the amendment power has to observe 
substantive unamendability imposed upon it by the Constitution.
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state and church. In these states, the constitution-maker, as holder of 
the constituent power, decides to shield secularism from possible 
revisions, as it is considered a central element within the 
constitutional order, an unalterable aspect of the constitutional 
identity. In some states, however, which do not include such explicit 
unamendable protection of secularism, courts have held that such an 
eternal protection derives implicitly from the constitution. This is the 
case, for example, of Italy and India. 
Italy is a predominantly Catholic country, but simultaneously 
defines itself a secular state. In contrast to France, secularism is not 
explicitly proclaimed in the constitution rather it is deduced from the 
fundamental norms contained in the 1948 Republican Constitution.47
In a number of decisions, the Corte Costituzionale, which carries the 
ultimate competence to interpret the Constitution, affirmed the 
Italian state’s secular character, as derived from a holistic reading of 
the Constitution’s various provisions.48
The Italian principle of secularism—laicità,49 as expounded by 
the Italian Constitutional Court, means protection and promotion of 
religious freedom within a pluralist regime of confessions and 
cultures. It is neither state’s indifference toward religions, nor an 
instrument to block religious presence in the public sphere. 
Consequently, laicità refers to a mixture of values and 
responsibilities in a modern plural and democratic state, in which 
religion has an active role. In other words, laicità presumes an 
equally respect-worthy plurality of values in the area of religion and 
conscience, necessitates state neutrality regarding religious and non-
religious beliefs, and demands equal protection for both.50 For these 
reasons, Italian laicità is regarded as positive and active (laicità 
positiva).51
47. See Francesca Astengo, Freedom of Religion Crucified? Secularism and 
Italian Schools Before the European Court of Human Rights, 41 POLITIQUE 
EUROPÉENNE 12, 17 (2013). 
48. Racc. uff. Corte Cost., decisions No. 203/1989; No. 259/1990; No. 
13/1991; No. 195/1993; No. 421/1993; No. 334/1996; No. 329/1997; No. 508/2000; 
No. 327/2002 (It.). See also Astengo, supra note 47, at 12.
49. On the terminology of secularism in Italy, see Edoardo Tortarolo, How 
Do You Say ‘Secular’ in Italian?, in MAKING SENSE OF THE SECULAR: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES FROM EUROPE TO ASIA 56-67 (Ranjan Ghosh ed., 2013).
50. Alessandro Ferrari & Silvio Ferrari, Religion and the Secular State: The 
Italian Case, in RELIGION AND THE SECULAR STATE: INTERIM NATIONAL REPORTS
431, 433 (Javier Martínez-Torrón & W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 2010).
51. See id. at 432-33; see also Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs: 
Practice and Observance in the EU Member States, EUR. PAR. DOC., 26 n.10 (2013) 
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Italian laicità, as just described, was classified by the Italian 
Corte Costituzionale in decision number 203/1989 among the 
“supreme principles of constitutional order.”52 Why is this 
classification important? The labeling of laicità as one of the 
fundamental principles of the constitutional order allegedly means 
that it is located beyond the reach of the amendment power and that 
its revision would be subject to the control of the constitutional 
court. The Italian Constitution of 1947 includes an explicit eternity 
provision according to which “[t]he form of Republic shall not be a 
matter for constitutional amendment.”53 Italian scholars suggested 
that in addition to this explicit protection, other fundamental 
principles such as democracy and inviolable rights are implicitly 
unamendable.54 The Italian Constitutional Court accepted this 
approach in its decision number 1146/1988, when it declared the 
following: 
The Italian Constitution contains some supreme principles that cannot be 
subverted or modified in their essential content . . . . Such are principles 
that the Constitution itself explicitly contemplates as absolute limits to the 
power of constitutional revision, such as the republican form . . . as well as 
principles that, although not expressly mentioned among those not subject 
(UK), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474399/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2013)474399_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/VDS3-GFB8] (describing positive 
secularism in such a manner “that the principle implies non-indifference by the state 
with regard to religions but a state guarantee for safeguarding religious freedom in a 
régime of denominational and cultural pluralism”). It has been recently argued that 
the court’s recent approach is less active, as in two recent cases, it defined the 
principle of secularism as “equidistance and impartiality” of the state with regard to 
religious faith. See Pietro Faraguna, Regulating Religion in Italy: Constitution Does 
(Not) Matter (under review, copy with author) (referring to Corte Cost., 2000, n. 508 
and Corte Cost., 2016, n. 52).
52. Racc. uff. Corte Cost., 12 aprile 1989, n. 203 (It.), 
http://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=370 [https://perma.cc/WZH6-XLT4].
53. Art. 2 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
54. See, e.g., PIETRO FARAGUNA, AI CONFINI DELLA COSTITUZIONE. PRINCIPI 
SUPREMI E IDENTITÀ COSTITUZIONALE 69-72 (2015) (It.); Paolo Galizzi, 
Constitutional Revisions and Reforms: The Italian Experience, in THE CREATION 
AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 235, 241 (Mads Andenas ed., 2000); 
Tania Groppi, Constitutional Revision in Italy: A Marginal Instrument for 
Constitutional Change, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 203, 210 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 
2013); Carlo Fusaro, Italy, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 211, 215 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
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to the principle of constitutional revision, are part of the supreme values 
on which the Italian Constitution is based.55
Therefore, taking decision number 203/1989 together with 
decision number 1146/1988 would mean that notwithstanding the 
explicit protection of republicanism, the Italian Constitutional Court 
recognized additional supreme constitutional principles that are 
unamendable, secularism being one of them.
Italy is not the only example where secularism was considered 
as an unamendable or eternal principle by a court’s decision, 
deriving this implicitly from the constitution. India is another 
important jurisdiction where secularism has been declared by the 
Court to be an implicitly entrenched principle. 
The Preamble of the 1950 Indian Constitution opens with the 
following declaration: “We, The People of India, having solemnly 
resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular 
Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens . . . .”56 Indian 
secularism functions in a manner that supports religious identity. 
Following the maxim sarva dharma sambhava (“all religions are 
valid”), India’s constitution was aimed to respect all religions.57 This 
in turn enabled the application of secular law to all areas of the law 
but family law, to which religious communities could be governed 
by their particular set of laws.58 Of course, a long discussion on 
secularism in India is beyond the narrow scope of this Article.59 My 
55. Racc. uff. Corte Cost., 15-29 dicembre 1988, n. 1146 (It.), 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=1988&numero=1
146 [https://perma.cc/2KAV-3WZ9]. Cited at Louis Del Duca and Patrick Del Duca, 
Emergence of the Italian Unitary Constitutional System, Modified by Supranational 
Norms and Italian Regionalism in FEDERALISM AND LEGAL UNIFICATION 267, 273 
(Daniel Halberstam and Mathias Reimann eds., 2014). 
56. INDIA CONST. pmbl. 
57. Cyra Akila Choudhury, (Mis)Appropriated Liberty: Identity, Gender 
Justice and Muslim Personal Law Reform in India, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 45, 
47 (2008).
58. See id.
59. Much has been written on secularism in India. See, e.g., DONALD 
EUGENE SMITH, INDIA AS A SECULAR STATE (1963); M. M. SANKHDER, SECULARISM 
IN INDIA: DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES (1992); SARAL JHINGRAN, SECULARISM IN 
INDIA: A REAPPRAISAL (1995); MANVINDER KAUR, CHALLENGES TO SECULARISM IN 
INDIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAL, POLITICAL PROCESS, AND PROSPECTS (1999); S.
K. GHOSH, SECULARISM IN INDIA: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE (2001); GARY 
JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT (2003); THE CRISIS OF SECULARISM IN INDIA (Anuradha 
Dingwaney Needham & Rajeswari Sunder Rajan eds., 2007); M. Mohsin Alam, 
Constructing Secularism: Separating ‘Religion’ and ‘State’ Under the Indian 
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aim here is to briefly demonstrate how secularism, as a constitutional 
principle, has become an implicit eternal principle in Indian 
jurisprudence. 
In contrast with other states, such as Turkey, Portugal, or 
Chad,60F60 in India, secularism is not an explicit unamendable or eternal 
principle. Indeed, the Indian Constitution lacks any unamendable 
provisions whatsoever. Moreover, rooted in British tradition, Indian 
jurisprudence initially rejected the notion of implicit unamendability. 
That position, however, drastically changed in the 1960s and 1970s 
following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s extensive attempts to 
amend the constitution. These events led to the judicial development 
of what has become known as the “Basic Structure Doctrine.” 
According to this doctrine, developed in the famous Kesavananda
case in the early 1970s, the constitutional amendment power does not 
include the power to abrogate or change the identity of the 
constitution or its basic features.61F61 This Doctrine has since migrated 
from India to other jurisdictions.62F62
While the question of which principles are included within this 
basic structure is contentious, it appears that it is undisputed today 
that it includes, at the very least, the principle of secularism 
alongside other principles such as the democratic form of 
government, federalism, judicial independence, and the separation of 
powers.63F63 Indeed, already in the Kesavananda case, several judges 
Constitution, 11 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 29-55 (2009); DOMENIC MARBANIANG,
SECULARISM IN INDIA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2011); RAJEEV BHARGAVA,
SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS (2014); Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious 
Freedom, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 885 (Sujit 
Choudhry, Madhav Khosia & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016).
60. See infra Section II.A.
61. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (India). On 
the case and the Basic Structure Doctrine, see, e.g., A. LAKSHMINATH, BASIC 
STRUCTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: LIMITATIONS AND JUSTICIABILITY
134-85 (2002); SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
INDIA: A STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE 43 (2009); T. R.
ANDHYARUJINA, THE KESAVANANDA BHARATI CASE—THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY BY SUPREME COURT AND PARLIAMENT (2011). 
62. Yaniv Roznai, The Migration of the Indian Basic Structure Doctrine, in
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF JUSTICE V. R. KRISHNA
IYER 240 (Malik Lokendra ed., 2012).
63. Sujit Choudhry, How to Do Constitutional Law and Politics in South 
Asia, in UNSTABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM 18, 21-22 (Mark Tushnet & Madhav Khosla 
eds., 2015). Of course, the content of each of these principles may in itself be open 
to disagreements. 
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opined that secularism is part of the Constitution’s basic structure.64
In the case of R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, the principle of 
secularism was held to be a basic feature of the Constitution, one 
among the Constitution’s foundational principles to which 
parliament must adhere.65
The clearest manifestation for this was given in the case of S. 
R. Bommai v. Union of India, which concerned dismissals of state 
governments in Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan 
on the basis that the actions of these governments undermined the 
secular foundations of the Constitution.66 The dismissal was upheld 
on the ground that governmental officials in these states had violated 
the requirement of secular governance:
Secularism is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The acts of a 
State Government which are calculated to subvert or sabotage secularism 
as enshrined in our Constitution, can lawfully be deemed to give rise to a 
situation in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.67
The idea that secularism is an “unalienable segment of the 
basic structure of the country’s political system” was once again 
confirmed in the case of Praveen Bhai Togadia v. State of 
Karnataka.68
64. See Kesavananda, at 292 (Sikri J), 582 (Shelat & Grover JJ) (India). 
65. R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 324; see also,
e.g., ASHOK DHAMIJA, NEED TO AMEND A CONSTITUTION AND DOCTRINE OF BASIC 
FEATURES 339 (2007); SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, Constitutional Federalism in the 
Indian Supreme Court, in UNSTABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 63, at 320, 
366; LAKSHMINATH, supra note 61, at 225-28.
66. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 1 (India). See Soli J. 
Sorabjee, Decision of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India: A 
Critique, http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/94v3a1.htm#Note169 [https:// 
perma.cc/E69P-9FET] (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
67. JACOBSOHN, supra note 59, at 126 (citing Bommai, 3 SCC at 149 
(India)). According to Justices Sawant and Kuldip Singh, actions that go counter to 
the creed of secularism are prima facie proof of conduct in defiance of the 
provisions of our Constitution. Bommai 3 SCC at 5. Justice Sawant, for example, 
referred to a destruction of a mosque in Ayodhya, stating that: 
The destruction of mosque was a concrete proof of the creed which the 
party in question wanted to pursue. In such circumstances, the 
Ministries formed by the said party could not be trusted to follow the 
objective of secularism which was part of the basic structure of the 
Constitution and also the soul of the Constitution.
JACOBSOHN, supra note 59, at 145 (citing Bommai 3 SCC at 3 (India)).
68. Praveen Bhai Togadia v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2004 SC 2081 (India). 
The case concerned hate speech. The Supreme Court held that the judiciary is 
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This means that in India, according to the current prevailing 
jurisprudence, the constitutional principle of secularism cannot be 
revised through formal constitutional amendments. As the court 
stated in Bommai: “[W]e do not know how the constitution can be
amended so as to remove secularism from the basic structure of the 
constitution . . . it is enough for us to know that the constitution does 
not provide for such a course.”69
This story about explicit and implicit protection of secularism 
as an unamendable principle points prima facie to provide a positive 
answer to the question I posed in the beginning of this Article; yes, 
in some states, secularism is non-negotiable by the mere fact that it is 
described as an eternal, unamendable principle. In that respect, 
Michel Rosenfeld is certainly right to claim that “ideological 
secularism seeks . . . protection from others, including religions, 
which stand in the way of the path to the good it has set out for 
itself.”70 The use of constitutional mechanisms for shielding 
secularism from being amended or completely abolished is one 
manner for such a “protection.” 
In the next Section, I analyze three case studies of states, which 
protect in their constitutions secularism as an eternal principle, to 
examine whether the designation of eternity means non-negotiability.
I demonstrate how the mere description of a constitutional principle 
as eternal or unamendable does not mean it is not open for 
modifications. 
II. ETERNAL YET NEGOTIABLE?
This second Part is the core of the Article. It opens with three 
case studies focusing on three states with a majority-Muslim 
population: Turkey, where the state’s new founder, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, established a modern secular republic rejecting an Ottoman 
legacy; Tajikistan, where the secular approach is a direct 
continuation of the Soviet’s control and suppression of religions; and 
Mali, where secularism was inherited from its former colonial ruler, 
France. All three states protect secularism as an eternal principle. 
empowered to limit freedom of expression if the inflammatory speech aims to incite 
mutual hatred that is likely to create disharmony and disturb the public peace.
69. JACOBSOHN, supra note 59, at 141 (citing Bommai, 3 SCC at 13 (India)). 
70. Michel Rosenfeld, Recasting Secularism as One Conception of the 
Good Among Many in a Post-Secular Constitutional Polity, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL 79, 108 (Susana Mancini & Michel 
Rosenfeld eds., 2014).
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The case studies explore various tensions within the state–religion 
divide and various circumstances that have influenced the secular 
principle. It then continues to argue that notwithstanding the 
designation of a constitutional principle as eternal, it is still prone to 
changes and modifications. First, constitutional provisions which are 
not self-entrenched may simply be formally amended. Second, the 
principle of secularism does not carry a monolithic meaning. In light 
of its vague and elastic nature, it is open to various interpretations 
and reinterpretations. Finally, especially when the formal written 
constitution conflicts with the often changing spirit or culture of the 
society, the ability of the formal written constitution to hinder or stop 
changes is limited. Constitutional principles may be described as 
eternal, but they cannot completely resist changes.
A. Three Case Studies
Does the absolute entrenchment of secularism in a constitution 
mean that it is non-negotiable? This section examines the situation in 
three jurisdictions that include in their constitutions the principle of 
secularism as an eternal principle: Turkey, Tajikistan, and Mali. This 
examination is aimed to demonstrate that constitutional immutability 
(in the sense of describing certain principles as immutable) does not 
necessarily mean constitutional stagnancy. 
1. Turkey
There is a huge volume of literature on the role secularism 
plays in Turkey.71 Hence, this section merely briefly highlights the 
so-called eternal protection of secularism in Turkey and describes, as 
I regard it, its changing nature. 
The legal order of the Ottoman state, which existed for over six 
centuries (1280 to 1922), was based on Islamic religious law—the 
71. See, e.g., ZEYNO BARAN, TORN COUNTRY: TURKEY BETWEEN 
SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM (2010); DEMOCRACY, ISLAM & SECULARISM IN TURKEY
1-2 (Ahmet T. Kuru & Alfred Stepan eds., 2012); NIYAZI BERKES, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 4 (1998); ÜMIT CIZRE, SECULAR AND 
ISLAMIC POLITICS IN TURKEY: THE MAKING OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY 
(2008); BORA KANRA, ISLAM, DEMOCRACY AND DIALOGUE IN TURKEY:
DELIBERATING IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2009); M. HAKAN YAVUZ, SECULARISM AND 
MUSLIM DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 144 (2009). 
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Sharia.72 In 1923, the Republic of Turkey was founded as a nation-
state. The new republic’s founders, most notably, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, the Turkish republic’s founder, rejected the Ottomans 
legacy and aimed to establish a westernized society based on the 
modern paradigm of secularism (laiklik).73 Accordingly, in 1924, the 
caliphate was abolished, and a new constitution was adopted. The 
new constitution declared in Article 2 Islam as the official religion of 
the state, yet in 1928 this constitutional provision was repealed. In 
1937, the principle of laiklik received a constitutional status in 
Article 2 in order to “better reflect modern Turkey’s adherence to a 
strict separation of state and religion.”74 This official state policy of 
laiklik was established in both the later 1961 and 1982 
constitutions.75
In the 1982 constitution, the preamble states that there should 
be “no interference whatsoever of sacred religious feelings in state 
affairs and politics,” and Article 1 declares Turkey a republic.76
Article 2 specifies that the republic is a “democratic, secular and 
social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts 
of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human 
rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the 
fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.”77 Most importantly for 
this study, according to Article 4, both Article 1 and Article 2—
which establish the form of the state as a republic and specify its 
characteristics—may not be amended and their amendment may not 
be proposed.78 Accordingly, the Turkish principle of secularism is 
72. See Ergun Özsunay, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the 
Freedom of Religion or Belief in Turkey, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1087, 1087 
(2005). 
73. See Serdar Demirel, The Roots of Headscarf Ban in Turkey, 5 J. ISLAM 
IN ASIA 164-2QWKHKLVWRULFDOURRWVRI.HPDOLVPLQ7XUNH\VHH0ùNU
+DQLR÷OXThe Historical Roots of Kernalism, in DEMOCRACY, ISLAM & SECULARISM 
IN TURKEY, supra note 71, at 32-60.
74. RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 27 (2010); see also
Benjamin D. Bleiberg, Unveiling the Real Issue: Evaluating the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the Turkish Headscarf Ban in /H\ODùDKLQY
Turkey, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 129 ,134 (2005).
75. HIRSCHL, supra note 74, at 27. 
76. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 1982 pmbl. and art. 1.
77. Id. at pt. I, art. 2.
78. On unamendable provisions in Turkey, see, e.g., Bertin Emrah Oder, 
Turkey, in THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 263-
310 (Markus Thiel ed., 2009); see also Olcay, supra note 40*OúHQ6HYHQ	/DUV
Vinx, The Hegemonic Preservation Thesis Revisited: The Example of Turkey, 9 
HAGUE J. RULE L. 45, 45 (2017).
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granted the highest normative protection, shielding it from any 
attempts that seek to change its existence as a constitutional norm 
through formal revisions to the constitution.79
One important manifestation of the special protection granted 
to the principle of secularism is the ban on political parties that aims 
to abolish secularism.80 The Turkish Constitutional court shut down 
six parties under the 1961 constitution, and eighteen parties under the 
constitution of 1982; many of these dissolutions have been based on 
alleged violations of the protected principle of secularism.81
The best way in which this unamendability has managed to 
protect secularism can be examined through the lenses of the 
headscarf debate in Turkey. One of the most important symbolic 
aspects of the modern Turkey was the “dress code reform” declared 
by Atatürk in 1925. The Headgear Act of 1925 banned the traditional 
head cover for men (fez) who were obliged to wear European-style 
hats.82 Soon after, in 1930, the Islamic veil was banned. The Dress 
(Regulation) Act of 1934 banned wearing religious dress other than 
79. Mehmet Cengiz Uzun, The Protection of Laicism in Turkey and the 
Turkish Constitutional Court: The Example of the Prohibition on the Use of the 
Islamic Veil in Higher Education, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 383, 399 (2010). 
80. See generally Dicle Kogacioglu, Progress, Unity, and Democracy: 
Dissolving Political Parties in Turkey, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 433, 433-34 (2004). 
81. See SVETLANA TYULKINA, MILITANT DEMOCRACY: UNDEMOCRATIC 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND BEYOND 169 (2015). Indeed, the ban on the function of 
certain political parties can be viewed as an ex-ante eternity provision, since it aims 
to block political parties that aim to change or abolish the fundamentals of the 
constitutional order from even being elected, thereby from even having the political 
ability to suggest a change to the constitution’s basic principles. See, e.g., Sharon 
Weintal, The Challenge of Reconciling Constitutional Eternity Clauses with Popular 
Sovereignty: Toward Three-Track Democracy in Israel as a Universal Holistic 
Constitutional System and Theory, 44(3) ISR. L. REV. 449, 468 (2011) (who argues 
that the Israeli ban on political parties “sets the barrier against revolutionary 
amendments not at the end of the road, in order to strike them down following their 
ratification, but at the gates of the constituent assembly, thereby neutralizing their 
potential initiators”). On the Nexus between eternity clauses and the ban on political 
parties, see also RIVKA WEILL, HOLEY UNION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADOX OF 
SECESSION (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2708859 [https://perma.cc/2V8Z-
BZJ8]; see also Mazen Masri, Unamendability in Israel—A Critical Perspective, in
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTION? UNAMENDABILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2840941 [https://perma.cc/L7ZS-
QNS3].
82. See Yaniv Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendment—The Turkish Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional 
Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 175, 178 (2012) (citing Turkey’s 
Act No. 671 of 25 November 1341 (1925) on the Wearing of Hats).
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in places of worship or at religious ceremonies.83 The fez and veil 
were considered symbols of the old regime, which conflicted with 
modernization and secularization.84 These measures were aimed at 
creating religion-free zones where all citizens would be treated 
equally and without distinction on religious grounds.85
In the 1980s, when young educated women began wearing the 
Islamic headscarf in public places, such as universities, the issue 
arose once again. As the policy was that Islam cannot exist in a place 
of education, university administrations prohibited female university 
students from wearing headscarves at universities.86 In 1981, a first 
set of regulations prohibiting female staff members and students 
from wearing veils in higher educational institutions was issued by 
the cabinet. The following year, the Council of Higher Education 
<NVHNg÷UHWLP.XUXOXRU<g.EDQQHG WKH ,VODPLFKHDGVFDUI LQ
university lecture halls.87 These regulations were challenged before 
the Council of State, the highest administrative court, which 
approved them on the basis that “wearing the headscarf is in the 
process of becoming the symbol of a vision that is contrary to the 
freedoms of women and the fundamental principles of the 
Republic.”88 In response to these measures, in 1984 the majority 
Motherland Party [Anavatan Partisi] passed a law according to which 
“[a] veil or headscarf covering the neck and hair may be worn out of 
religious conviction.”89 The President of the republic challenged the 
law before the Constitutional Court, and the Court annulled the 
provision, holding that it was contrary to Articles 2 (secularism), 10 
(equality before the law), and 24 (freedom of religion) of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court explained that secularism—an 
83. See id. (citing Turkey’s Act No. 2596 of 3 December 1934 on the 
Prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments).
84. Demirel, supra note 73, at 166-67. 
85. In the current 1982 Constitution, these bans receive a constitutional 
protection in Art. 174, according to which “[n]o provision of the Constitution shall 
be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws . . . which 
aim to . . . safeguard the secular character of the Republic.” CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY pt. V, art. 174. 
86. WILLIAM HALE & ERGUN ÖZBUDUN, ISLAMISM, DEMOCRACY AND 
LIBERALISM IN TURKEY 71 (2010). For an elaborated review of the headscarf ban in 
universities in Turkey, see FATMA NEVRA SEGGIE, RELIGION AND THE STATE IN 
TURKISH UNIVERSITIES: THE HEADSCARF BAN 30-39 (2011).
87. See SEGGIE, supra note 86, at 30-39.
88. See /H\OD ùDKLQ Y 7XUNH\ -XI; 44 EHRR 99 GC. Grand 
Chamber’s decision, ¶ 37 (Turk.). 
89. See id. at ¶ 38. 
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essential condition for democracy—prohibits the state from showing 
a preference for a particular religion or belief, and that a secular state 
cannot invoke religious conviction when performing its legislative 
function. Once outside the private sphere of individual conscience, 
the freedom to manifest one’s religion could be restricted on public-
order grounds to defend the principle of secularism.90 After this 
judgment, Anavatan Partisi enacted another law in 1990, according 
to which “[c]hoice of dress shall be free in institutions of higher 
education, provided that it does not contravene the laws in force.”91
Again, this law was challenged before the Constitutional Court by 
the main opposition party. In 1991, the Constitutional Court held 
that, in light of the principles it had established in its earlier 1989 
judgment, this provision did not allow headscarves to be worn in 
institutions of higher education on religious grounds and so was 
consistent with the Constitution.92 In other words, while not 
invalidating the new law, the Court interpreted it in a way that still 
prohibited wearing headscarves in universities. Accordingly, the ban 
on wearing headscarves in universities was not based on statutory 
law but was practically imposed by public bodies based upon the two 
above-mentioned judicial decisions.93
In light of the fact that, for years, female university students 
could not exercise their right to education because of dress that they 
use to cover their heads, in 2008, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly adopted an amendment to the constitution regarding the 
principle of equality and the right to education with the explicit aim 
90. Constitutional Court Decision, E. 1989/1, K. 1989/12, March 7, 1989, 
Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi [Constitutional Court Reports], No.25, 133-
65. The Court stated that “[s]ecularism is the civil organiser of political, social and
cultural life, based on national sovereignty, democracy, freedom and science. 
Secularism is the principle which offers the individual the possibility to affirm his or 
her own personality through freedom of thought and which, by the distinction it 
makes between politics and religious beliefs, renders freedom of conscience and 
religion effective. In societies based on religion, which function with religious 
thought and religious rules, political organisation is religious in character. In a 
secular regime, religion is shielded from a political role. It is not a tool of the 
authorities and remains in its respectable place, to be determined by the conscience 
of each and everyone . . . .” Id. at ¶ 39. 
91. See Roznai & Yolcu, supra note 82, at 180 (citing Turkey’s Law No. 
2547 (1981)).
92. See Constitutional Court Decision, E. 1990/36, K. 1991/8, April 9, 
1991, Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi [Constitutional Court Reports], vol. 1, 
285-323.
93. See Ergun Özbudun, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in
Turkey, 15 EUROPEAN PUB. L. 533, 537 (2009).
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to preclude the possibility of discrimination by the universities based 
upon religious grounds, and to eliminate any deprivation of the right 
to an education in higher education institutions. The underlying 
purpose was to abolish the headscarf ban in universities. The 
constitutional amendment was challenged before the Turkish 
Constitutional Court. On June 5 of that year, the Constitutional Court 
delivered a controversial decision in which it invalidated the 
amendments to the Constitution.94 Since I have elaborated on this 
judgment elsewhere (together with Serkan Yolcu), it is sufficient for 
now simply to note that the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled that 
these amendments infringed on the constitutionally enshrined
principle of secularism and were therefore unconstitutional.95
Turkey is therefore rather unique, because it is where the Court 
actually protects or enforces this unamendability or eternity of the 
secularism principle through substantive judicial review of 
constitutional amendments.96 But for our matter, the importance is 
94. Turkish Constitutional Court decision, June 5, 2008, E. 2008/16; K. 
2008/116, Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette], October 22, 2008, No. 27032, 109-52 
(“Headscarf Decision of 2008”). On the “headscarf” amendment and the 
constitutional crisis, see also ERGUN ÖZBUDUN & ÖMER F. GENCKAYA,
DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TURKEY 106-09
(2009); see also Mehmet Cengiz Uzun, The Protection of Laicism in Turkey and the 
Turkish Constitutional Court: The Example of the Prohibition on the Use of the 
Islamic Veil in Higher Education, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 383 (2009); 
Abdurrahman Saygili, What Is Behind the Headscarf Ruling of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court?, 11 TURKISH STUD. 127, 131 (2010).
95. See Roznai & Yolcu, supra note 82, at 175. Yolcu and I have criticized 
this judgment on various grounds. Specifically as for the principle of secularism, we 
have claimed that the wearing of religious symbols by students in universities (in 
contrast with that of teachers in primary schools) reflects the choice of individuals to 
adhere to their cultural and religious identity when entering the public sphere; it has 
no bearing on the secularism principle enshrined in a constitution, which obliges the 
state to act in a neutral manner with respect to religious identity, to separate state 
and religion, and to provide a civil-secular state education. See also Uzun, supra
note 94, at 425 (“[I]n a democratic state the use of a religious symbol by an 
individual should eventually be seen under the auspices of the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, and religion per se should not be construed as an 
abstract risk to a secular/laic democratic state apparatus.”).
96. Following the headscarf ban case, Yolcu and I have argued that: “The 
lesson for the future Turkish constitutional debate should be clear: the judicial 
review of constitutional amendments ought to be limited to formal regularity.” 
Roznai & Yolcu, supra note 82, at 206. Indeed, in a more recent decision on 
parliamentary immunity of June 3, 2016, the Turkish Constitutional Court held that 
in light of the explicit constitutional ban on substantive (in contrast with procedural) 
review of constitutional amendments, it could not substantively review the 
constitutionality of an amendment. This contradiction reveals inconsistency in the 
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not in this abolishment of a constitutional amendment, but with the 
events that have occurred in the aftermath of this judgment. 
After the Constitutional Court’s decision, and especially with 
the resistance the government encountered in its attempt to draft a 
new constitution, the government was left with no available legal 
channels to address the headscarf ban. This led the party to resort to 
sub-constitutional administrative measures to achieve its goals. 
Indeed, in 2010 it found a de facto solution to the issue. After 
receiving a complaint from a female university student who was 
expelled from a classroom due to her refusal to take off her hat 
(which was a practical replacement for the headscarf), the Council of 
Higher Education issued a formal order to the university that 
students who disobey the disciplinary code may not be expelled from 
class. In other words, instead of expelling students wearing 
headscarves from the classrooms, such students may only be 
reported. This order managed to create a bypassing channel to 
circumvent the headscarf ban in universities, de facto ending it.97 No 
legal actions were brought against this lift of the headscarf ban.
2. Tajikistan 
Tajikistan, one of five Central Asian countries with a majority 
Sunni population, presents a special case of the conflict between 
secularism and religion; during its contemporary history, a long 
confrontation between secular and religious groups challenged the 
secular character of the state.98
Tajikistan’s Constitution of 1994 states that the country is a 
democratic and secular republic (Article 1) and, more relevant to our 
study, includes in Article 100 an unamendable provision according 
to which among other principles, “The secular . . . nature of the State 
court’s jurisprudence in enforcing constitutional unamendability. For an analysis, 
see Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment; 43 YALE J.
INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018); BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 424, at 89 (November 25, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2875931. 
97. Ahmet T. Kuru & Alfred Stepan, Laicite as an “Ideal Type” and a 
Continuum, in DEMOCRACY, ISLAM & SECULARISM IN TURKEY, supra note 71, at 95, 
104; see also Zafer Çelik & Bekir S. Gür, Turkey’s Education Policy During the AK 
Party Era (2002-2013), 15 INSIGHT TURK. 151, 167-68 (2013); Seven & Vinx, supra
note 78, at 45; Seval Yildirim, Global Tangles: Laws, Headcoverings and Religious 
Identity, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 45, 64 (2012).
98. See Hakim Zainiddinov, The Changing Relationship of the Secularized 
State to Religion in Tajikistan, 55 J. CHURCH & ST. 456 (2013). 
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[is] unchangeable.”99 Moreover, Article 2 of the Constitutional Law 
of the Republic of Tajikistan on Referendum explicitly refers to 
“[i]ssues beyond referendum of the Republic of Tajikistan,” stating 
that “in accordance with Article 100 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Tajikistan . . . [the] secular. . . essence of the state [is] 
. . . immutable and . . . not subject to solicitation by referendum in 
the Republic of Tajikistan.”100 Therefore, the principle of secularism 
is considered an unamendable constitutional principle. 
Tajikistan’s approach toward religions “is a continuation of the 
Soviet method of control and suppression of religion and religious 
organizations.”101 However, Tajikistan is a predominantly Muslim-
populated country, where Islam takes a central part in their social 
and economic life. This meant that the declaration of the state was a 
secular one, coercively (and in a way artificially) separating Islam 
from the state. As Hakim Zainiddinov demonstrates, notwithstanding 
the declaration of the state as secular, the Tajikistani government was 
connected with religious institutions and even also announced an 
adherence to Islamic values.102 Tajikistan, for example, is the only 
Central Asian country to officially register an Islamic political party. 
In 1991, when Tajikstan gained independence, the Islamic Revival 
Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was officially registered.103
Soon after the 1991 declaration of independence, a power 
struggle between the neo-communist government and a 
heterogeneous opposition, in which the IRPT emerged as a very 
significant actor, coupled with strong regional forces, brought the 
new state to a five-year devastating civil war (1992-1997) with 
significant consequences for a population of seven million 
99. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN 1994 arts. 2, 100. 
100. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN ON REFERENDUM 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN 1995 art. 2. 
101. Under Soviet rule, the state was clearly anti-religious, seeking to 
weaken and ultimately diminishing political and financial power of religious 
institutions. See Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 457. Among other measures, courts 
that apply Sharia were banned, religious schools and mosques were closed, Waqf 
lands were confiscated, and religious clergies were arrested. Id. On the “Soviet 
assault on Islam,” see generally, ADEEB KHALID, ISLAM AFTER COMMUNISM:
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 50-83 (2007). 
102. See Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 456.
103. See id. at 458.
278 Michigan State Law Review 2017
inhabitants: around 100,000 dead, 800,000 people fleeing their 
homes and a destroyed economy and socio-political life.104
In November 1991, Rahmon Nabiyevich Nabiyev, a former 
first secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, won the 
Presidential election; a win that led to protests (mainly from the 
eastern part of the country) from both pro-democracy parties and the 
IRPT. Nabiyev’s supporters, mainly from the southern part of the 
country, reacted with counter-protests. The clashes between the two
groups broke out in Dushanbe and spread across the south of 
Tajikistan, resulting in the start of the civil war. The events forced 
Nabiyev to negotiate with opposition leaders on power-sharing, 
negotiations that have resulted in 1992 with an establishment of a 
coalition government that included Islamist and pro-democratic 
forces. The same year, President Nabiev was forced to resign,105 and 
soon after, the coalition government was defeated by the “People’s 
Front” composed of southern armed groups supported by Russia, 
Uzbekistan, and the country’s northern part. This brought President 
Emomali Rahmon to power, and soon after, the government 
attempted to restore its control in religious affairs, banning, in 1993, 
the IRPT from operating.106
With Russian and Uzbekistani support, the Rahmon 
government decided to continue its armed combat up to the defeat of 
the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). In 1996, after years of military 
fighting, the confronting sides agreed to cease-fire and negotiate. 
After negotiations in Moscow, an Agreement on the Establishment 
of Peace and National Accord was signed in 1997 to settle the 
conflict.107 The Agreement started a new era in state–religion 
relationships as it guaranteed that the UTO would take part in ruling 
all government sectors based on a thirty percent quota allocated to its 
representatives. Supporters of the Islamic Revival Party made up the 
majority of the opposition.108
Notwithstanding the peace agreement, tensions between the 
religious and secular sides remained high, particularly around the 
104. Id. at 459-60. See Shirin Akiner, Prospects for Civil Society in 
Tajikistan, in CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 
149, 160 (Amyn B. Sajoo ed., 2002).
105. Id. at 460.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id.; see also Tim Epkenhans, Regulating Religion in Post-Soviet 
Central Asia: Some Remarks on Religious Association Law and “Official” Islamic 
Institutions in Tajikistan, 20 SECURITY & HUM. RTS. 94, 95 (2009).
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nature of the secular state. The secular side considered secularism to 
be non-religious rather than anti-religious.109 As noted by Sayfullo 
Safarov, the secular side intended “to be free from any influences of 
various religions.”110 In contrast, the religious side considered 
secularism as anti-religious. They regarded the protection of the 
principle of secularism as a “safety measure” against the option of 
turning to a religious state.111 Thus, the religious groups insisted on 
excluding the term “secular state” from Articles 1 and 100 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan.112 Such a maneuverer 
would have allowed the future modification of the state away from 
its secular nature. In fact, as pointed out by Grant Smith, whereas the 
religious side “did not want to foreclose the option of an Islamic 
government . . . [g]overnment leaders, in contrast, strongly opposed 
any opening to possible creation of an Islamic State.”113
The dialogues between the conflicting groups resulted in a 
compromise, which kept Article 100 on the unamendability of the 
secular nature of the state in the constitution. At the same time, it 
introduced an amendment to Article 28 to the Constitution that 
allowed religious parties to function in the country. These changes 
were incorporated into the Constitution by a people’s referendum in 
1999.114 In other words, the compromise maintained the recognition 
of the secular character of the state by the religious groups in 
exchange for the legalization of religious parties and power sharing. 
These changes enabled the IRPT to legalize and legitimize itself in 
1999 after being banned in 1993. IRPT’s leadership realized that 
they had to compromise over the initial goal of broadly spreading 
Islam, as outlined in the IRPT’s charter of 1991.115 The leadership of 
the IRPT emphasized the necessity to adhere to the secular nature of 
the state. They declared that Islamist political organizations and 
109. Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 461.
110. Sayfullo Safarov, Searching for a Compromise: Proposals for 
Consolidating Confidence Between Representatives of Secular and Islamic 
Worldviews, in FROM CONFIDENCE BUILDING TOWARDS CO-OPERATIVE CO-
EXISTENCE: THE TAJIK EXPERIMENT OF ISLAMIC–SECULAR DIALOGUE 192, 194 (Jean-
Nicolas Bitter et al. eds., 2005). 
111. Muhiddin Kabiri, The Hermeneutics of the Dialogue to Achieve a 
Secular-Islamic Compromise in Tajikistan, in FROM CONFIDENCE BUILDING 
TOWARDS CO-OPERATIVE CO-EXISTENCE, supra note 110, at 199, 201.
112. Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 461.
113. R. Grant Smith, Tajikistan: The Rocky Road to Peace, 18 CENT. ASIAN 
SURV. 243, 246 (1999).
114. Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 462.
115. Id.
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parties cannot put their interests over the state’s interests. Therefore, 
if they win the elections, they would govern in accordance with the 
secular constitution without jeopardizing the state’s secular 
character. The IRPT’s new charter of 1999 introduced these changes 
to its goals and strategies.116
The compromise allowing the functioning of religious political 
parties was therefore considered as not changing the secular nature 
of the state, even if religious parties win a high percentage of votes, 
because they would have to act within the secular nature of the 
constitutional order as guaranteed by Article 100.117
This compromise was not easy for any of the sides. Before 
1992, the IRPT posed political Islam as its ideology.118 After the start 
of the civil war, it joined the armed opposition, implicitly fighting for 
the establishment of an Islamic State. After the signing of the 1997 
peace agreement with its new 1999 charter, the IRPT has become a 
modern political party, which avoids any suggestion that Tajikistan 
should advance toward becoming an Islamic State. Instead of 
considering the role of Islam as an element for society’s radical 
reconstruction, the IRPT changed its perception to the role of Islam 
as a national, spiritual, and cultural element.119
As for the Tajikistani government, which inherited the legacy 
of the Soviet ruling regime, allowing the outlawed opposition parties 
to function legally was also a difficult decision to make. Yaacov Ro’i 
argued that the Soviet heritage envisaged intolerance toward the 
existence of any opposition and a strict separation of church from the 
state.120 For some, it might even have been difficult to grasp the idea 
of how religious political parties can coexist with the secular state. 
Some of the secular population regards Islam as an uncompromising 
religion, which brings the fear that even if Islamists can accept some 
limited compromises, there is always a dangerous potential for quick 
radicalization.121 Therefore, whereas the government allowed the 
legalization of opposition religious parties, it simultaneously 
116. Id. at 463.
117. Muhiddin Kabiri, The Tajik Experience of a Multiparty System—
Exception or Norm?, in PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL ASIA 21, 24 (Birgit 
N. Schlyter ed., 2003). 
118. Emmanuel Karagiannis, The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: 
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, 34 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 1, 12 (2006).
119. See id.
120. Yaacov Ro’i, Islam in the FSU—An Inevitable Impediment to 
Democracy?, in DEMOCRACY AND PLURALISM IN MUSLIM EURASIA 101, 102 (Yaacov 
Ro’i ed., 2004).
121. Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 474.
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tightened its control over religion, limiting the public space for 
religious associations.122
Following the end of the civil war, Tajikistani society has 
become increasingly conservative, with social ills—such as 
prostitution and human trafficking, alcoholism, and drug use together 
with high levels of unemployment and widespread poverty—
contributing to the popularity of radical religious groups and the 
revival of “Muslim values.” This is evident, for instance, by the 
revival of polygamy and the growing number of women wearing a 
hijab.123 Consequently, underground Islamic groups have recently 
flourished across the country, some of which aim to promote the 
establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.124 One notable group is the 
largest radical Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic 
Party of Liberation), which became active in the late 1990s and was 
banned in 1999 in light of its aim to establish an Islamic State.125
This increase of radical underground Islamic groups should be 
understood in light of the legitimation of the IRPT. As Karagiannis 
explains, the legalization of the IRPT and its participation in local 
and central government have ironically led to a decline in its 
popularity among the traditional supporters.126 In light of the IRPT’s 
pragmatic views on social and economic problems and “low profile,” 
it became hard to distinguish the IRPT from other secular parties.127
The ideological vacuum was then filled by other religious groups 
such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.128
Recent years demonstrate an increasing religious environment. 
“Since 2005, a course on the history of religions with a textbook on 
the history of Islam has been taught in public schools at the 10th 
grade level,” and since 2009, “Tajikistan has a mandatory religious 
education in public schools.”129 The preamble to the new 2009 law 
on religion recognizes the “special role of the Hanafi school of Islam 
122. Id. at 457; see also Epkenhans, supra note 108, at 95.
123. Karagiannis, supra note 118, at 14.
124. Aziz Niyazi, Islam and Tajikistan’s Human and Ecological Crisis, in
CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL ASIA 180, 189-90 (M. Holt Ruffin & Daniel C. Waugh 
eds., 1999).
125. Karagiannis, supra note 118, at 1-5.
126. See id. at 2.
127. See id. at 17.
128. See id.
129. ROBIA CHARLES, SECULAR REGIMES AND STATE ENGAGEMENT WITH 
RELIGION IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA 39 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley), http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/ 
Charles_berkeley_0028E_13144.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DYQ-5UQ2].
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in the development of the national culture and moral life of the 
people of Tajikistan (The Hanafi school of Islam is a Sunni branch 
with which most citizens in the country identify).”130 Such 
recognition has not appeared in any of the previous versions of 
Tajikistan’s law on religion, and in fact Tajikistan became the first 
country in the region to recognize any form of Islam.131
Has the principle of secularism changed in Tajikistan? From a 
communist approach toward religion now, as Zainiddinov correctly 
notes, the state’s attitude toward religion seems to be ambiguous.132
On the one hand, the state introduce[ed] a mandatory class on Islam . . . , 
holds international Islamic conferences, celebrates anniversaries of 
prominent Islamic scholars, allocates . . . land . . . for Saudi missionaries 
to build . . . mosque[s], and [even] receive[d] the honored title of “The 
Islamic Culture Capital” for 2010.133
On the other hand, the state prohibits prayers at the workplace and 
prohibits the azaan (the call to prayer proclaimed five times a day) to 
be given by loudspeakers.134 Tajikistan is declared a secular state, 
and the secular nature of the state is deemed to be unamendable. 
Nonetheless, the principle of secularism has gone through some 
major changes as governmental power is shared with Islamic forces; 
and while restricting some religious practices, the state allows or 
even encourages religious independence which is developing to a 
widespread and enhanced Islamization process of the society.135
3. Mali 
The story of secularism in Mali is fascinating.136 Independent 
Mali inherited the notion of secularism, or laïcité, from France, its 
130. Id. at 43; see Robert C. Blitt & W. Cole Durham, Analysis of the 
Republic of Tajikistan’s Draft Law ‘About Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Unions’, 26 U. TENN. C.L. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES (2008) (analyzing early 
drafts of the 2009 law).
131. CHARLES, supra note 129, at 43.
132. Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 467.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See generally KHALID, supra note 101 (discussing the “Islamic Revival” 
in Central Asia, and how Central Asian states, after their independence, have 
resorted to similar methods the Soviet Union had applied to control and contain 
religion). 
136. See Fatou Kiné Camara & Abdourahmane Seck, Secularity and 
Freedom of Religion in Senegal: Between a Constitutional Rock and a Hard Reality, 
2010 BYU L. REV. 859, 867-68 (2010) Arguably, the principle of secularity in Mali 
goes way back in history, to the Mali Empire, which covered most of West Africa. 
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former colonial ruler, and declared itself in its 1960 Constitution a 
“secular” republic.137 Strangely enough, it appears that colonial rule 
in Mali actually intensified Islamization. As Alex Thurston describes 
it, the movement of people and ideas accelerated conversions to 
Islam, and as Mali transitioned to independence in 1960, it did so as 
a newly Muslim-majority country.138 In the first decades after 
independence, notwithstanding the state’s efforts to marginalize 
Islamic activists, Islamic schools and mosques proliferated, and 
during the 1980s, state-sponsored Islamic institutions and unofficial 
Islamic groups emerged, altogether preparing the ground for a 
blossoming Islamic social life in the 1990s with about 150 Islamic 
associations.139
By the end of the 1980s, after a long period of hierarchical and 
centralized governance inherited from ancient kingdoms, French 
colonial administration, and post-independence military and one-
party regimes, people began expressing their anger with such 
autocratic precedents.140 In 1991, President Moussa Traoré was 
The Charter of Kurukan Fuga, commonly known as the Constitution of the Empire 
of Mali, and designed by the empire’s founder, Sundiata, in 1236 A.D. reflected a 
tradition of secularity and also respect toward both Islam and traditional religion. 
While the Charter recognized in Article 1 that “Muslim marabouts, or sufis, make 
up an essential part of society,” it limited the role of Muslim leaders to teaching 
religions and states nothing about state affairs: “The five clans of marabouts are our 
teachers and our educators in Islam. Everyone has to hold them in respect and 
consideration.” Id. (citing CHARTER OF KURUKAN FUGA (CONSTITUTION OF THE 
EMPIRE OF MALI) art. 3). 
137. See, e.g., Yuhniwo Ngenge, International Influences and the Design of 
Judicial Review Institutions in Francophone Africa, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 433, 442 
(2013) (demonstrating how French-speaking sub-Saharan African states borrowed 
from French constitutional and political traditions, while showing certain deviations 
from it).
138. Alex Thurston, Towards an “Islamic Republic of Mali?”, 37 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 45, 48 (2013) (“Under colonialism, more people moved from one 
place to another. They moved as refugees fleeing wars, freed slaves coming home, 
workers forced into labor, soldiers serving in the military, or traders operating in the 
colonial economy. . . . Changes sparked by colonialism disrupted pre-existing 
hierarchies of power, reshaping the social roles of the core groups within pre-
colonial Muslim networks: merchants, clerics, and warrior-rulers. Individuals’ 
conversions to Islam disrupted certain ethnic groups’ claims to define the faith. 
Models of Muslim identity changed. Pressures grew to standardize worship practices 
throughout the Muslim community. . . . By the waning years of colonial rule in the 
1940s and 1950s, Muslims had a strong presence in Malian politics, economy, and 
society.”). 
139. Id. at 49-51.
140. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly & Fabiana Machado, Popular Views 
of the Legitimacy of the State in Mali, 36 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 197, 198 (2002). 
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overthrown by popular forces with the help of the military led by 
General Amadou Toumani Touré. General Touré presided over a 
year-long military-civilian transition, ending with a new 
Constitution. General Touré first established “The Transition 
Committee for the Salvation of the People,” which quickly drafted 
the rules for political participation.141 The first decree issued by the 
Committee established freedom of association, whereas the second 
decree banned political parties that were based on religion.142 The 
new constitution of 1992 declares, in the Preamble, that the people of 
Mali “solemnly undertake to defend the republican and secular form 
of the state.”143 Moreover, according to Article 25, “Mali shall be [a] 
. . . secular . . . Republic.”144 Article 20 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Mali states that “[p]ublic education shall be obligatory, 
free and secular.”145 Article 28 stipulates that political parties must 
respect the secularity of the State.146 And, most importantly to our 
investigation, the Constitution of Mali includes in Article 118 a 
provision according to which “the secularity of the State . . . shall not 
be the object of revision.”147 This affirms the fundamental character 
of the principle of secularism.
Between 1992 and 2012, Mali had only two presidents. Alpha 
Oumar Konaré won the 1992 competitive election and was re-elected 
in 1997. Touré—returning from retirement—won the elections of 
2002 and 2007. Throughout this time, Islamic associations acted as a 
pressure group and claimed an involvement in policy-making. After 
two decades of political liberalization and multi-party elections, 
expression of diverse Muslim identities was facilitated. Muslim 
activists, as I describe below, managed to influence and shape 
politics and values through mass movements and media.148 It is 
141. Thurston, supra note 138, at 50. 
142. See id.
143. See Constitution of the Republic of Mali, 1 HUM. RTS. L. AFR. 228, 228 
(Christof Heyns, Hatem Ben Salam & Umozurike Oji Umozurike eds., 1996).
144. Id. at 228.
145. Id. at art. 229.
146. Id. at 230. 
147. Id. at 231; see also Julien Lacabanne, Les Principes Intangibles Dans la 
Constitution Malienne, FAIRE-SON-DROIT 1, 9 (2015), https://www.academia.edu/ 
29572505/Les_principes_intangibles_dans_la_Constitution_malienne_-_J._Lacabanne
(Fr.) (discussing the limitations on the revision power in Mali).
148. See Thurston, supra note 138, at 47; see also Julia Leininger, It’s 
Institutions, Not Theology! Muslim Actors’ Influence on Democratization in Mali, 9 
POL. & RELIGION 815 (2016) (highlighting the relationship between religious actors 
and politics in Mali). 
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therefore interesting to examine how a vibrant Muslim civil society 
and media, which provided Muslim activists opportunities to engage 
with politics, somehow coexisted with the “secular” nature of the 
state or challenged the meaning of secularism. 
For example, when Mali was preparing for its 2002 presidential 
election, Muslim associations organized several mass rallies in which 
leaders of twenty Islamic associations from across the country met 
and urged voters to vote for candidates holding Islamic values. 
The influence of Muslim activist civil society and its ability to 
act as a pressure group in the political arena can be demonstrated 
through the struggle surrounding the 2009 “Code of Persons and of 
the Family” (Code des personnes et de la famille). The reform of the 
family code was years in the making, during which numerous 
consultations with political parties and civil and religious 
organizations took place. The aim was to reform the Family Code to 
encourage more equality between the sexes and social justice for 
women.149 In 2009, after the adoption of the code, Muslim religious 
leaders and religious associations started to mobilize citizens to 
protest against the code on religious grounds. They organized a mass 
rally of about 50,000 people who protested in the streets of the 
capital, Bamako, against the family code because it contradicted the 
Sharia. President Touré suspended the Code and subjected it to 
revision. After taking Muslim leaders’ concerns into account, a new 
modified version of the family code passed in 2011. This version 
preserved discrimination against women. In 2012, the High Islamic 
Council of Mali (HCIM) organized another mass rally urging the 
promulgation of the new code, which was indeed published a few 
days later. This demonstrates not only how much religious beliefs are 
prevalent in Malian “secular” society, but also the potential influence 
of certain religious streams and leaders on politics.150
The struggle over the family code provoked public debate and 
reflection about the role of Islam in politics and the nature of laïcité.
149. For understanding the efforts to reform the Family Code in Mali, see 
Dorothea E. Schulz, Political Factions, Ideological Fictions: The Controversy Over 
Family Law Reform in Democratic Mali, 10 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 132 (2003); see 
also Benjamin F. Soares, The Attempt to Reform Family Law in Mali, 49 DIE WELT 
DES ISLAMS 398 (2009).
150. This section builds heavily on Thurston, supra note 138, at 50-53; see 
also André Moine, La Prise en Compte Internationale de la Nature du Pouvoir au 
Mali, 31 CIVITAS EUROPA 59, 64 (2013) (Fr.) (mentioning that even if secularism 
excludes in principle the intervention of clerics over political decisions, it has no 
effect on the influence of religion on popular convictions).
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In 2009, the President of the HCIM, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, stated 
that instead of regarding laïcité as “the negation of religion by the 
State,” he prefers an approach of an “intelligent laïcité” in which 
“the rights of each are respected.”151 When asked about the 
implications of the HCIM’s involvement in national affairs, Dicko 
replied, “We are not positioning ourselves politically, but we are 
positioning ourselves with respect to the interests of our country. We 
are in a country where we are [ninety-five percent] Muslims. . . . You 
think that we can remain indifferent to what happens to these 
people?”152
Indeed, albeit the constitutional designation of the 
constitutional order as based on laïcité, Mali is a predominately 
Muslim country with over 90% of the population practicing some 
form of Islam. The possibility of a constitutional reform became 
“controversial in 2011 when, after years of ‘expert examination’ by 
the Constitutional Commission led by Daba Diawara,” the President 
“announced that a constitutional referendum would be coupled with 
the April 2012 presidential elections.”153 Drastic events that occurred 
in northern Mali in 2012, and have shaken the country since, brought 
issues of religious tolerance and the threat to secularism to the front. 
In 2012, after several bloody confrontations with the army, a 
rebellion began with the Tuareg-led National Movement for the 
Liberation of the Awazad (MNLA), declaring Azawad’s 
independence, making it an Islamic State.154 Therefore, more than a 
separatist rebellion, Islamic themes dominated the rebellion, as the 
151. Thurston, supra note 138, at 52 (quoting Makmound Dicko, Président 
du Haut Counseil Islamique du Mali: ‘C’est une Insulte pour notre pays,’ LE 
RÉPUBLICAIN, Aug. 12, 2009, http://malijet.com/a_la_une_du_mali/16604-mahmoudou_ 
dicko_president_du_haut_conseil_islamique.html [https://perma.cc/X6WN-FHXK]).
152. Thurston, supra note 138, at 59 (quoting Charlotte Idrac, Mahmoud 
Dicko: ‘Les Décisions Doivent Revenir aux Maliens’, RFI, Aug. 9, 2012, http:// 
www.rfr/afrique/20120809-mahmoud-dicko-decisions-doivent-revenir-maliens [https:// 
perma.cc/8G8C-6B9S]); see also id. at 52 (explaining that in 2010, the Secretary-
General of the HCIM, Mohamed Kimbiri, stated that “the [true] secular state 
integrates religions into the conduct of public affairs.” (quoting Tribune/Réplique de 
Mohamed Kimbiri à Me Bréhima Koné: ‘Oui à un Etat laïc, non à un Etat 
Islamophobe’, LE RÉPUBLICAIN (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.maliweb.net/news/ 
contributions/2010/12/06/article,468.html [https://perma.cc/R6RZ-J9R6])); Martin 
van Vliet, Weak Legislatures, Failing MPs, and the Collapse of Democracy in Mali,
113 AFR. AFFAIRS 45, 63 (2014).
153. See Susanna D. Wing, ‘Hands Off My Constitution’: Constitutional 
Reform and the Workings of Democracy in Mali, 53 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 451, 452 
(2015).
154. See Thurston, supra note 138, at 46.
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MNLA was supported by several Islamist well-armed groups such as 
the Movement for the Uniqueness and the Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO), Al-Qaeda in Islamic Magreb (AQMI), Boko Haram 
(Nigeria), and the Islamist group Ansar al-Din (Defenders of the 
Faith), which together with its allies, controlled much of northern 
Mali. After the occupation of the entire north of the country up to 
Timbuktu and Gao, these jihadist movements expelled MNLA from
the region and—opposing the secular nature of the state—they 
declared Sharia to be the fundamental law. The inability of the state 
institutions to control the situation led to a coup d’état that ended the 
regime of President Toumani Touré. A transitional government was 
put in place under African and international pressure, yet facing 
complete incapacity, the Islamic forces committed atrocities, and
destroyed and vandalized administrative, religious, and cultural 
buildings. All this caused an international turmoil. Mali’s interim 
President requested the French government and the Economic 
Community of West African States’ urgent assistance. When Islamist 
forces pushed south into the Mopti region in early January 2013, 
French military, with a noteworthy backing of Chad and Niger, 
managed to re-conquer northern Mali and to stop the jihadist armies’ 
advancement toward the capital.155
During the 2012–2013 crises, the religion–secularism tension 
was high. In August 2012, the transitional government created a 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, which had long been demanded by the 
HCIM. Since its creation there have been dialogues about the nature 
of the state and conditions for applying Sharia in the country, which 
threatens the “secular” nature of the state.156 For example, the Deputy 
Minister for Religious Affairs maintained that “Mali is a secular state 
connected with [the] religions.”157 According to this understanding, 
religious belief does not belong to the private sphere, but religion is 
involved in the functioning of state affairs. Likewise, Mahamoud 
Dicko, the abovementioned President of HCIM, has said that “[n]o 
155. On the decline of both state authority and legitimacy in the run-up to the 
dramatic events that took place during the first months of 2012, see van Vliet, supra
note 152, at 63.
156. Thurston, supra note 138, at 60.
157. Rokia Diabate, Laïcité du Mali en Péril: Le Ministre Délégué Chargé 
des Affaires Religieuses et le Président du Haut Conseil Islamique Font le Lobbying 
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article in the Malian Constitution prevents religions from meddling 
with politics.”158 In July 2013, a new President was elected. Whilst 
maintaining secularism as a republic principle, the President began 
his inauguration speech with a long verse from the Koran.159
On the other hand, when conditions for opening a dialogue 
between the Transitional Government and rebel groups in northern 
Mali were dictated, respect for the territorial integrity of the country 
and the secular nature of the state were selected.160 The 
Ouagadougou Agreement of 18 June 2013 contains provisions to this 
effect. The parties not only declared “their attachment to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Mali of 25 February 1992” and thus 
to the principle of secularism contained therein, but they also 
specifically agreed, in the preamble, to respect “[t]he secularism of 
Mali.”161 As negotiations continued, these principles remained 
unaltered. Notwithstanding the demands for the creation of an 
Islamic Republic of Mali, there was a strong stand, even on the part 
of several leading imams, for secularism.162 Therefore, even in the 
midst of the crisis, Malian officials made it very clear that certain 
constitutional principles were non-negotiable; namely, the secular 
nature of the state.163 Religious authorities, Susanna Wing 
emphasizes, had an important role to play in the fight against radical 
Islamist groups in the North.164
158. See id.
159. Secularism at Risk in Sub-Saharan Secular States: the Challenges for 
Senegal and Mali, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy. 
net/5050/fatou-sow/secularism-at-risk-in-subsaharan-secular-states-challenges-for-
senegal-and-mali [https://perma.cc/RP73-N3E5].
160. See U.N. Secretary General, Report on the Situation in Mali, ¶ 10, U.N. 
Doc. S/2013/189 (Mar. 26, 2013).
161. ACCORD DE OUADADOUGOU (Fr.), http://news.abamako.com/documents/
docs/AccorddeOuagadougou.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LVM-8GXT] (last visited Apr. 
21, 2017).
162. Wing, supra note 153, at 469.
163. See Lamine Diallo, Le Ministres des Affaires Étrangères a Propos de la 
Crise au Nnord: “L’intégrité Territoriale, la Laïcité et le Caractère Républicain du 




WWSS]; see also Adam Nossiter, Rebels in North Mali Sign Peace Deal Allowing in 
Government Troops, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/ 
19/world/africa/mali-and-rebels-reach-peace-deal.html [https://perma.cc/JB7Y-M8BK]; 
Wing, supra note 153, at 469.
164. Wing, supra note 153, at 469.
The Paradox of Eternal Secularism 289
Of course, notwithstanding this alleged “non-negotiability,” the 
spread of militant Islamic groups; the application of Sharia criminal 
penalties; the increase of religious schools, associations, and 
mosques; the active participation of Muslim religious leaders and 
organizations in political debates and their influence thereof; and the 
general prominence of religion in the public sphere, also had their 
own dynamics, which seemed to many as if Mali was shifting away 
from the principle of laïcité enshrined in the Malian Constitution. 
The question exists: Can the secularism barrier resist the thrusts of 
those Islamic powers that advocate for a direct intervention in 
politics?165
So where does Mali go? A recent policy paper demonstrates 
how several Malian politicians and religious leaders are critical about 
the French interpretation of the secularity principle, which they see 
as anti-religious, rather than as a guarantee of religious freedom:166
They emphasize that the principle of “laïcité” should entail respect of 
religious diversity, equal treatment by the state of different religious 
groups[,] . . . and the right of each individual to practice their religion 
[even] in the public sphere. 
Based on interviews with religious leaders and politicians in Mali, this 
report briefly explores aspects of Islam as a political force in Mali [and]
the different understandings of the concept of laïcité among Malians . . . 
[The report] argue[s] that [in Mali:] 
[R]ather than a shift from a “secular” to an “Islamist” state, the concept of 
“laïcité” is undergoing renegotiation. This entails, firstly, a renegotiation 
of the principle of religiously “neutral” governance. Many Malian 
Muslims in the urban elite emphasize that Islam is a democratic religion 
. . . and retain the right to express political arguments based on Muslim 
values. . . . [M]any of the defenders of the right to express political views 
with reference to Muslim values stress the equal right of all citizens to 
participate in political debate and to hold office. In effect, this 
renegotiation of religiously “neutral” governance entails an increased 
emphasis on religious pluralism, rather than an insistence upon the 
“absence” of religious affairs in governance. This reassertion of religious 
freedom is simultaneously a defense against “federalism” and an increased 
autonomy of the northern areas, and thus, the protection of the territorial 
integrity of Malian nationhood. 
Moreover, the secularity of the state is defended in the sense that the 
separation between the state and religious institutions is maintained: State 
religion does not have strong defendants among politicians in Bamako, 
165. See Moine, supra note 150, at 61. 
166. TONE SOMMERFELT & KRISTIN JESNES, ‘LAÏCITÉ’ IN SOUTHERN MALI:
CURRENT PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS ON SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 9 (2015), 
https://www.fafo.no/images/pub/2015/20410.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6JY-E99R].
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and religious organizations are not under direct state control. However, the 
tolerance for political standpoints based on religious values is rising, 
especially in debates over family law and gender politics. Several 
prominent Muslim leaders develop explicit political agendas and they 
debate, in public, where the religious sphere ends and the political sphere 
begins. . . . In this sense, they challenge the strict, French version of 
secularism as “laïcité”, and its colonial legacy. 
Secondly, renegotiation of “laïcité” also takes the form of increased 
government involvement in and control over religious affairs. In an effort 
to distance Mali from extremist Islam, and in response to the advances of 
extremist Salafist groups in northern Mali, the state is seeking to control 
religious groupings, for instance by establishing guidelines for religious 
leadership, preachers and education. This increased state participation in 
the religious domain further accentuates the visibility of religious issues in 
public debate.167
The report’s findings and conclusion seem to suggest that the 
principle of secularism in Mali, although “eternal”, is still negotiable. 
B. On the Negotiability of “Eternal” Principles
1. Non-self-entrenched Eternity Clauses
Most of the world’s eternity clauses establish the 
unamendability of certain constitutional principles, but they are 
themselves not self-entrenched.168 If such an un-entrenched provision 
protects the principle of secularism from revisions, can the 
unamendable provision itself be amended? Theoretically, there are 
several approaches for resolving the challenge posed by eternity 
clauses that are not self-entrenched.169 According to the first 
approach, if an eternity clause is not self-entrenched, then the 
protected eternal principles may be amended in a double amendment 
procedure; in the first step, the eternity clause is itself repealed (an 
act that is not in itself prohibited), and in the second step, the 
previously—but no longer—protected principle is revised or 
167. See id. at 9-10.
168. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 101-02 (2000). 
169. I have written about this earlier in Yaniv Roznai, Amending 
‘Unamendable’ Provisions, CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
BLOG (Oct. 20, 2014), http://constitutional-change.com/amending-unamendable-
provisions/ [https://perma.cc/PGP7-Z2FS]. On this dilemma, see also Richard 
Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 655, 662-
64 (2015).
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abolished.170 I have previously argued for a different approach, which 
seeks to provide eternity clauses a purposive interpretation according 
to which even if they are not self-entrenched, they should be 
regarded as such; otherwise the use of eternity provisions is almost 
meaningless.171 Paraphrasing Georges Liet-Veaux’s La “Fraude a la 
Constitution”,172 I argued that from a substantive or purposive 
perspective, the double-amendment procedure should be regarded as 
“fraud upon the constitution” because “what cannot be done directly 
cannot be done indirectly.”173 If my claim for the implicit 
entrenchment of eternity clauses is not accepted, then surely even 
eternal principles such as secularism can simply be revised; either in 
a double-amendment procedure or perhaps even in a single 
procedure.174
This is what occurred in Portugal. Recall, Article 288 of the 
Portuguese Constitution of 1976 explicitly placed the separation 
between state and church beyond the amendment power, alongside 
other principles.175 In 1989, Article 288 was itself amended, and the 
170. See the debates in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 111-14 (3d ed. 2000); see also Virgílio Afonso da Silva, A Fossilised 
Constitution?, 17 RATIO JURIS 454, 456-57 (2004); Eivind Smith, Old and 
Protected? On the “Supra-Constitutional” Clause in the Constitution of Norway,
44(3) ISR. L. REV. 369, 375 (2011).
171. See ROZNAI, supra note 11, at 142-43. For a similar claim, see Jason 
Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1818 (2005).
172. Georges Liet-Veaux, La ‘‘Fraude a la Constitution’’: Essai d’une 
Analyse Juridique des Révolutions Communautaires Récentes: Italie, Allemange, 
France, 59 REVUE DU DROIT ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FR. ET A L’ETRANGER
116 (1943) (Fr.).
173. ROZNAI, supra note 11, at 140. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 
325 (1866). On this maxim, see generally D.K. Singh, “What Cannot Be Done 
Directly Cannot Be Done Indirectly”: Its Meaning and Logical Status in 
Constitutionalism, 29 MOD. L. REV. 273 (1966).
174. Douglas Linder, for example, argued that there is no need for a two-
stage process, as the unamendable provision and the protected subject could both be 
repealed in the same act since the outcome is similar. See Douglas Linder, What in 
the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 729 (1981).
175. CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC Apr. 2, 1976, art. 290 
(amended in 1989 to article 288) (subsequently amended 2005): 
Material limits to revision 
1. Laws revising the Constitution shall not detract from:
a. national independence and the unity of the state;
b. the republican form of government;
c. the separation of the churches from the state;
d. the rights, freedoms and safeguards of citizens;
e. the rights of workers, workers’ committees and trade unions;
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protected principle of collective ownership of means of production 
was omitted, in order to open the economic system to a larger 
movement of privatization, which was necessary after Portugal’s 
entry to the European Community in 1986.176 This controversial 
amendment was never challenged before the Constitutional Court.177
Accordingly, if one principle that is part of the “material limit” to 
revision can be amended, then arguably other principles, such as “the 
separation of the churches from the state,” can similarly be 
amended.178
Although different, the 2005 Togo crisis yields a similar 
conclusion. The 1992 Constitution of Togo includes a constitutional 
revision procedure in Article 144.179 It also includes certain 
f. the principle of collectivisation of the main means of production and 
land and of natural resources and the abolition of monopolies and large 
estates;
g. the democratic planning of the economy;
h. the appointment of the elected members of the organs of supreme 
authority, the organs of the autonomous regions and the organs of local 
government by direct, secret and regular universal suffrage and the system 
of proportional representation;
i. plurality of expression and of political organisation, including political 
parties, and the right of democratic opposition;
j participation by local people’s organisations in local government;
k. the separation and interdependence of the organs of supreme authority;
l. the scrutiny of legal provisions for active unconstitutionality and 
unconstitutionality by omission;
m. the independence of the courts;
n. the autonomy of local authorities;
o. the political and administrative autonomy of archipelagos of the Azores 
and Madeira.
Id. 
176. See JORGE BACELAR GOUVEIA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN PORTUGAL 22
(2011). On this amendment, see also VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 207 n.39 (2009); 
Jónatas E.M. Machado, The Portuguese Constitution of 1976: Half-life and Decay,
in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON 
EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA, supra note 54, at 273, 286-97.
177. See Paulo Ferreira da Cunha, Constitutional Sociology and Politics: 
Theories and Memories, 5 SILESIAN J. LEGAL STUD. 11, 25 (2013) (noting that this 
amendment “has always shocked us because it undermines the standard meaning 
and thus causes the Constitution to lose all of its enforceability”). 
178. See id.
179. TOGO CONSTITUTION OF 1992, art. 144 (“The initiative of revision of the 
Constitution belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic and to one-fifth 
(1/5) at least of the deputies composing the National Assembly. The bill or the 
proposal of revision is considered as adopted if it is voted with the majority of four-
fifths (4/5) of the deputies composing the National Assembly. In default this 
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circumstantial limits to constitutional amendments: “No procedure of 
revision may be engaged or pursued in a period of interim or of 
vacancy or when the integrity of the territory is infringed.”180
On February 5, 2005, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, Togo’s President 
since 1967, died. Stephen Schnably describes the events that 
followed: “Within hours, the military declared his son Faure 
Gnassingbé the new president. Article 65 of Togo’s Constitution, 
however, provided that if the president died, the Speaker of the 
[National Assembly] was to exercise the functions of the presidency 
for sixty days,” during which elections would be held.181 In light of 
this constitutional rule, Fauré Gnassingbé’s accession was regarded 
by the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West 
African States, and France (Togo’s former colonial ruler) as a blatant 
and unacceptable violation of the Togolese Constitution. Eyadéma’s 
son’s accession was regarded as either the initiation of a family 
dynasty or the effort by the military to rule from behind the scenes, 
or both.182 The government justified the accession based on wide and 
inherent emergency powers. The military claimed that because the 
speaker was absent from the country at the moment the president 
died (he was in Paris), a power vacuum was created that called for 
swift action to ensure stability and order.
One difficulty with this claim is that by announcing the 
suspension of the constitution and closing the country’s borders, the 
military prevented the Speaker’s return. In light of the increasing 
external pressure, Fauré Gnassingbé resigned and was immediately 
elected (on February 6) by the Togolese National Assembly as the 
new speaker, a position that made him eligible to exercise the 
President’s powers for sixty days. Then, by unanimous vote, the 
majority, the bill or proposal of revision adopted with the majority of two-thirds 
(2/3) of the deputies composing the National Assembly, is submitted to referendum. 
The President of the Republic may submit to referendum any bill of constitutional 
law.”).
180. Id. Circumstantial limits to constitutional amendments are those 
constitutional provisions that specify the circumstantial dimension in which 
constitutional amendments are prohibited. See KEMAL GÖZLER, LE POUVOIR DE 
RÉVISION CONSTITUTIONNELLE 122-23 (1997) (Fr.); Yaniv Roznai & Richard Albert, 
Limitations on Constitutional Amendment in Emergencies (unpublished manuscript, 
2017) (on file with author).
181. See Stephen J. Schnably, The OAS and Constitutionalism: Lessons from 
Recent West African Experience, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 263, 267 (2005).
182. For a review of the events, see id.; Stephen J. Schnably, Emerging 
International Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure and Revision: A 
Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 474 (2008). 
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National Assembly also exercised its constitutional amendment 
power under Article 144 to revise the constitution, modifying Article 
65 in order to allow the son to serve out the remainder of his father’s 
term in the case of a vacancy. Fauré Gnassingbé was sworn in the 
next day. The AU strongly condemned this constitutional revision 
that was made in violation of the relevant provisions of the Togolese 
Constitution and suspended Togo’s participation in the 
organization.183 Schnably notes that “there was ample ground in 
Article 144 to question the amendments’ validity. Article 144 
provides that amendments may not be adopted when the presidency 
is vacant . . . The presidency may well have been vacant on February 
6, when the legislature adopted the amendments.”184 However, the 
Togolese National Assembly took the position that a constitutional 
limitation on the amendment power might itself be amended out of 
existence. Therefore, at the same time it elected Fauré Gnassingbé as
Speaker and amended Article 65, the Togolese legislature also 
amended Article 144 to remove the prohibition on amending the 
constitution when the presidency was vacant.185 After pressure from 
the AU and the Economic Community of West African States, Togo 
backed down; “On February 21, [2005], the National Assembly 
amended the constitution yet again to provide for elections within 
sixty days, essentially reversing the previous amendments.”186 Four 
days later, Fauré Gnassingbé resigned, a move that paved the way for 
a new Speaker and Interim President, Bonfoh Abass.187
The point here is not to emphasize the role of international 
community when it comes to domestic constitutional reforms,188 but 
183. Schnably, supra note 181, at 269. 
184. Id. at 269-70. 
185. Loi 2005-002 du 6 février 2005 portant modification des articles 65 et 
144 de la Constitution [Law 2005-002 of Feb. 6, 2005 amending Articles 65 and 144 
of the Constitution], J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE, Feb. 6, 2005 
(removing reference to vacancy of the presidency) (Fr.); see also Schnably, supra
note 181, at 270.
186. Schnably, supra note 181, at 270; Loi 2005-006 du 24 février 2005 
modifiant les articles 65 et 144 de la Constitution [Law 2005-006 of Feb. 24, 2005 
amending articles 65 and 144 of the Constitution], J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
TOGOLAISE, Feb. 24, 2005 (restoring the Togolese Constitution, arts. 65 and 144, to 
its former text) (Fr.).
187. See Schnably, supra note 181, at 270.
188. On this, and with a special reference to the 2005 crisis in Togo, see
Schnably, supra note 182, at 474-78. More generally, on international and supra-
national limitations on constitutional amendments, see Yaniv Roznai, The Theory 
and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2013).
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to focus on the ability to amend Article 144 itself. This is important 
because as aforementioned, Article 144 includes a material limit to 
constitutional change according to which the secularity of the state 
cannot be revised.189 True, the amendments at issue in the 2005 crisis 
did not address the issue of the secular form of government. 
However, it demonstrates how easily the article imposing limitations 
on constitutional change may itself be amended in the future. 
2. Fifty Shades of Secularism190
Apart from the possibility of revising the eternity clause itself, 
as described in the previous section, I wish to argue that even if the 
eternity provision remains intact, the meaning of the protect principle 
may change. Accordingly, the mere unamendability of secularism 
does not mean that it is non-negotiable.191 When secularism is 
protected in the constitution as an eternal principle, what is being 
protected is a constitutional principle, not a rule. Rules demand strict 
compliance and apply in an all-or-nothing fashion. Principles, in 
contrast, are more generalized guidelines, permit balancing, and may 
be realized in various degrees. The protection of a general 
constitutional principle such as secularism is a flexible protection 
because the elasticity and the semantic openness of these terms allow 
their content to evolve and change along social changes. The 
protected principle of secularism can be interpreted, reinterpreted, 
and shaped through time, practice, and legislation.192
In his excellent book on secularism in India, Gary Jacobsohn 
wrote, “Now, secularism may very well be an immutable principle, 
189. TOGO CONSTITUTION OF 1992, art. 144.
190. I borrow the use of “50 shades of secularism” from Hillel Sommer, The 
Canadian Override Mechanism: A “Bête Noire”? A White Knight? Designing 50 
Shades of Grey, presented at a symposium titled The Constitution of Canada: 
History, Evolution, Influence, and Reform (May 24, 2017).
191. Cf. Rosenfeld, supra note 70, at 88 (“[I]deological secularism’s 
amenability to partial conversion on matters of utmost importance to its way of life
suggests that it is open to significant accommodation of competing conceptions of 
the good.”). Rosenfeld here refers to “amendability”, but in the case of 
unamendability, it would mean negotiability. 
192. See Dieter Conrad, Basic Structure of the Constitution and 
Constitutional Principles, in LAW & JUSTICE—AN ANTHOLOGY 186, 194 (Soli J. 
Sorabjee ed., 2003); ROZNAI, supra note 11, at 215-16. On rules and principles more 
generally, see Robert Alexy, On the Structure of Legal Principles, 13 RATIO JURIS.
294, 295 (2000), and Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
14, 25 (1967). 
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but what . . . is secularism?”193 As Justice Reddy admitted in the 
Bommai case in which the principle of secularism was recognized as 
a part of the constitution’s basic structure, secularism by itself is “not 
capable of precise definition.”194 Indeed, there is no single clear 
definition of secularism. Of course, in general, secularism “involves 
organizations and legal constructs that reflect the institutional 
expressions of the secular in a nation’s political realm and public 
life.”195 More specifically, “[I]n secular regimes, sovereignty belongs 
to the nation and not to a divine body,” the state is separate from 
religion, the government is neutral toward all religions, and the 
education and legal systems are secular.196
But there may be various approaches to secularism.197
Secularism, even as an ideology that challenges religion in the 
political and social arena, is not monolithic, but, as Jonathan Fox 
notes, “[T]here are clearly divisions and competition within . . . the 
secular and religious camps.”198 For example, one can have a militant 
or fundamentalist understanding of secularism (something along the 
lines we often see in France and Turkey), which assumes that 
religion is only a private issue and that outer manifestations of 
religion cannot have any place within the public realm. In these 
places, secularism is not merely the separation of religion and 
politics, but a clear rejection of and active opposition to 
manifestations of religiosity in the public sphere. However, 
secularism need not necessarily be “hostile” toward religions, but it 
merely means that the state does not officially recognize any one 
religion.199 According to Bhikhu Parekh:
193. JACOBSOHN, supra note 59, at 159.
194. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1, 15 (India); 
JACOBSOHN, supra note 59, at 153.
195. Barry A. Kosmin, Contemporary Secularity and Secularism, in 
SECULARISM & SECULARITY: CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1
(Barry A. Kosmin & Ariela Keysar eds., 2007).
196. Adrien Katherine Wing & Ozan O. Varol, Is Secularism Possible in a 
Majority-Muslim Country?: The Turkish Example, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 5-6 (2006).
197. On the divergent interpretations of laicism see, e.g., René Rémond, La 
Laïcité et ses Contraires, 75 POUVOIRS 7, 7-16 (1995) (Fr.). 
198. JONATHAN FOX, POLITICAL SECULARISM, RELIGION, AND THE STATE 17 
(2015). 
199. Compare Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU
L. REV. 467, 472-73 (2001) (stating the premise of the separation of church and state 
is based on neutrality toward religion, not hostility), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating, “We find no constitutional requirement which makes 
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The secularist thesis can take several forms of which two are the most 
common. In its weaker version it separates state and religion and 
maintains that the state should not enforce, institutionalize or formally 
endorse a religion . . . and should in general retain an attitude of strict 
indifference to religion. In its stronger version it also separates politics and 
religion and maintains that political debate and deliberation should be 
conducted in terms of secular reasons alone.200
Therefore, there is a spectrum of secularism between militant 
secularism and secular states that acknowledge a state church. As for 
the latter, Jacobsohn gives the example of Sweden, which “had an 
established Church, but that legal designation hardly disqualifies [it] 
from asserting its secular credentials.”201 There are “mild” or “soft” 
versions of secularism, in which the separation of state and religion, 
privatization of religion, and differentiation between religious and 
non-religious spheres, are not fully and strongly implemented 
because religion is always present there and cannot easily be 
abandoned.202 In other words, there are various degrees of 
secularity.203 Lech Garlicki writes that: 
it necessary for the government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight 
against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”). 
200. BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL THEORY 322 (2000). 
201. JACOBSOHN, supra note 59, at 30. The Church enjoyed a special 
constitutional status for many decades until recently when it was disestablished, at 
least in major part. See E. Kenneth Stegeby, An Analysis of the Impending 
Disestablishment of the Church of Sweden, 1999 BYU L. REV. 703, 704 (1999); see 
generally C. Carlson, Excessive Entanglement of Church and State: Applying the 
Lemon Test to the Disestablishment of the Church of Sweden, 21 N.Y. L. SCH. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 593, 593-612 (2002). Of course, there are democratic countries 
that provide for the existence of a “state church” or an “official religion.” One may 
mention the CONSTITUTION OF DENMARK 1953, art. 4 provides that: “The 
Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as 
such, it shall be supported by the State.” See also CONSTITUTION OF NORWAY 1992,
art. 2 (“The Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the 
State. The inhabitants professing it are bound to bring up their children in the 
same.”).
202. Ahmet Kuru distinguishes between assertive secularism, which requires 
the state to play an assertive role in excluding religion from the public sphere (such 
as in France or Turkey) and passive secularism, which requires the state to be 
passive and allow public visibility of religion (such as in the U.S.). AHMET T. KURU,
SECULARISM AND STATE POLICIES TOWARD RELIGION: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE,
AND TURKEY 11- 12 (2009). 
203. See Jeroen Temperman, The Neutral State: Optional or Necessary?: A 
Triangular Analysis of State-Religion Relationships, Democratisation and Human 
Rights Compliance, 1 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 269, 269-70 (2006) (describing these 
degrees as “[i]ntermediate forms of state-religion affiliation”). 
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[T]he principal of separation of church and state is considered not only as 
admitting, but even as assuming, some cooperation between church and 
state. Even the definition of the state as “secular” is not contradictory to it: 
“The Constitution does not foresee any cooperation between the state and 
religious communities. Nevertheless, the state shall not ignore religion.”204
Garlicki provides the example of Switzerland, where “some 
cantons . . . have introduced the concept of separation of church and 
state, but in 1980, a popular referendum to implement complete 
separation of church and state was rejected.”205
Returning to the example of Portugal, which as 
aforementioned, provides an eternal protection for the separation 
between state and church in Article 288(c) of the Constitution, in 
other words, “[t]he separation between Church and State” is a 
substantive limit to constitutional revision.206 There are other 
constitutional provisions that reinforce this separation. Article 41(4) 
provides that “[c]hurches and other religious communities shall be 
separate from the state and free to organise themselves and to 
perform their ceremonies and their worship.”207 Article 43(2) and (3) 
prohibits the state to program education “in accordance with . . . 
religious directives” and excludes any link between “public 
education” and a religious belief.208 Moreover, according to Articles 
51(3) and 55(4), political parties “may not employ names that 
contain expressions which are directly related to any religion or 
church, or emblems that can be confused with national or religious 
symbols,” and trade unions must be “independent of . . . religious 
denominations.”209 Article 53 provides that “[t]he churches and 
religious communities are separate from the State and free to 
organize and exercise their own ceremonies and worship.”210 The 
Portuguese constitution establishes laicité in the form of a separation 
of church and state, but not laicisme, i.e., “a hostile implementation 
204. Garlicki, supra note 199, at 477-78.
205. Id. at 477.
206. See supra Section I.A; CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC
2005, pt. IV, tit. II, art. 288(c). 
207. CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC 2005, pt. IV, tit. II, ch. I, 
art. 41(4). 
208. Id. at pt. I, tit. II, ch. I, art. 43(2)-(3). 
209. Id. at pt. I, tit. II, ch. II, art. 51(3); id. pt. I, tit. II, ch. III, art. 55(4).
210. Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz et al., Directorate General for Internal Policies: 
Religious Practice and Observance in the EU Member States, EUR. PAR. DOC., 29
n.19 (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474399/ 
IPOL-LIBE_ET(2013)474399_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NQB-RKQU].
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of this separation.”211 In a decision of the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court from 1987, it was held “that the state obligation is not only to 
allow the operation of particular religions[,] but that the state is 
obliged to cooperate with such religions as ‘religious needs have 
become a legally recognized right that the state must ensure.’”212 In 
the words of Garlicki, “Non-identification and neutrality assume 
separation of church and state, but generally the separation is not an 
absolute one.”213
The rejection of an absolute separation is also visible in Italy, 
another state in which the principle of secularism is considered an 
unamendable principle (although implicitly and not explicitly).214
According to the Italian Corte Costituzionale, the principle of 
secularism implies to pay attention for religions that are not the 
dominant one and not to favor the majority’s religion.215 This 
approach, as Francesca Astengo suggests, distances itself both from 
total indifference to religions and from the laicité à la française,
which postulates religion’s explicit exclusion from the public 
sphere.216 The flexible nature of secularism, even when protected as 
an eternal principle, is evident from the three case studies conducted 
above. In Mali, it appears that the concept of laicité has undergone 
renegotiation, as the tolerance for political viewpoints based on 
religious values is rising, and as prominent Muslim leaders advance 
political agendas and debate them in the public sphere, both evident 
in the debates over the family code.217
In Tajikistan, on the one hand, the unamendability of 
secularism managed to moderate the Islamic political party that seeks 
to “play according to the rules of the game” and within the 
constitutional order’s super-protection of secularism. This seems to 
be in accordance with Hakan Yavuz’s contention that 
211. Garlicki, supra note 199, at 477.
212. Id. at 478.
213. Id. at 476.
214. See supra Section I.B. 
215. See Astengo, supra note 47, at 17.
216. See id. at 17-18 n.10. See Faraguna, supra note 51, for a discussion on 
the changing nature of secularism through Italian history, and the tension between 
the ‘written constitution’ and the ‘living constitution.’ Faraguna demonstrates how, 
paradoxically, the Italian Monarchical Constitution of 1848 designated Italy as a 
confessional State, yet an enquiry into law-in-practice or the ‘living constitution’ 
reveals a clear secular attitude of the state until 1929 when it became more in line 
with the formal constitution. See id.
217. See supra Subsection II.A.3.
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radical religious groups moderate their practices and ideologies when they 
enter into a competitive and rule-based participatory political system. . . . 
This process . . . allows the log-jam between polarized secular and 
religious forces to be broken discursively, as each side is now able to 
engage directly with the other along multiple channels of interaction in 
political and public spheres. . . .218
On the other hand, the forcible elimination of religion from 
Tajikistani society has led to the formation of radical Islamic groups. 
From the religion’s perspective, Islam is a necessary element of 
society, which was artificially separate from the state.219 The 
increasing religious environment, constitutional changes that have 
allowed participation of religious parties, and the legal recognition of 
the “special role of the Hanafi school of Islam” in the life of 
Tajikistan people all suggest that the secular nature of the state has 
been somewhat renegotiated.220
A change in the secular nature of the state also occurred in 
Turkey, notwithstanding the eternal protection of secularism in the 
constitution. The strong protection granted to the enshrined principle 
of secularism by the Constitutional Court, as evident in the struggle 
over the headscarf ban in universities, was eventually circumvented 
by the government by means of administrative tools, rather than 
major constitutional modifications. The eternal principle of 
secularism in Turkey need not be interpreted as unchangeable. See 
the claim of Svetlana Tyulkina: 
The idea of secularism, which is being shielded from any public debate, 
was introduced into Turkish society in the 1920s. . . . [I]t is apparent that 
the political situation has changed considerably since then and that the 
Ataturk reforms and ideas should now be interpreted in a way that better 
suits the current time. I do not argue that Turkey should abandon the 
principle of secularism altogether and thereby allow religion to flow 
immediately into the public sphere. Rather I would argue that it is time to 
reconsider the ideas introduces some 100 years ago to see if they are still 
compatible with major democratic principles accepted by society.221
Indeed, even within Turkey one can find today different 
opinions with regard to the meaning of secularism.222 Examining 
218. YAVUZ, supra note 71, at ix. 
219. Ro’i, supra note 120, at 102.
220. See supra Subsection II.A.2 (citing CHARLES, supra note 129, at 43).
221. TYULKINA, supra note 81, at 181.
222. See YAVUZ, supra note 71, at 153-59 (describes three modes of 
secularism in Turkey); Christopher Houston, Militant Laicists, Muslim Democrats, 
and Liberal Secularists: Contending Visions of Secularism in Turkey, in MUSLIM 
SECULAR DEMOCRACY 253, 254 (Lily Zubaidah Rahim ed., 2013).
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variations of laïcité in France, Turkey, and Senegal, Ahmet Kuru and 
Alfred Stepan have recently demonstrated “that not only secularism 
in general, but also laïcité, a particular conception of secularism with 
a historical and normative background, has multiple 
interpretations.”223 Amelie Barras summarizes the notion that 
secularism, as a constitutional principle, “shifts, gets (re)articulated 
and transformed with time and contexts;”224 even when it is eternal, it 
is not unchangeable. 
3. Volksgeist and Constitutional Unamendability 
It is interesting to note that the eternal constitutional 
entrenchment of secularism exists in states with large religious 
populations. Notwithstanding the constitutional protection of the 
separation of the churches from the state in the Portuguese 
Constitution, Portugal is perceived by many as a traditional Catholic 
society, and the vast majority of the population, 85%, identifies itself 
as Catholic.225 Guinea, to take another example, is a predominantly 
Islamic country, with Muslims representing 85% of the population,226
yet the constitution of 2010 stipulates in Article 154 that “the 
principle of secularity [laïcité] . . . may not be the object of a 
revision.”227 In fact, 140 million Muslims, i.e., about 13.5% of the 1 
billion Muslims living in predominantly Muslim countries, live in 
eleven predominantly Muslim countries, the constitutions of which 
proclaim the state to be secular.228 This is especially interesting 
because, as Garlicki notes, “Islam, from its very origins, has been 
223. Kuru & Stepan, supra note 97, at 115. 
224. AMÉLIE BARRAS, REFASHIONING SECULARISMS IN FRANCE AND TURKEY:
THE CASE OF THE HEADSCARF BAN 10 (2014) (documenting how, in both France and 
Turkey, activists have contested bans on headscarves, arguing that it is possible to 
believe in the values conveyed by secularism and simultaneously to remain devoted 
to a religious faith, thereby revisiting secularism to craft a space for their 
religiosity). 
225. Ricardo Alves, Secularism and Secularization in Portugal, REPÚBLICA E 
LAICIDADE 1, 3 (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.laicidade.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
01/Secularism-and-Secularization.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PKT-K42W].
226. See Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and 
the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the 
Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim Countries, 5 INT’L J. CIV. SOC’Y L. 43, 81 
(2007).
227. CONSTITUTION FOR THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA 2010, tit. XVII, art. 154.
228. See Stahnke & Blitt, supra note 226, at 47. The Muslim countries are 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. Id.
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aligned with the state; in this tradition, the identity of religion and 
government has always been one of Islam’s fundamental features.”229
In all of the three case studies conducted, there is a dominant 
religion. In Turkey, where the state is described as secular—a
unamendable principle, about 98% of the population is Muslim.230
Russell Powell, who has empirically studied Turkish perceptions of 
law and religion, argues that “Turkey is a very religious country in 
that polling consistently indicates that a significant majority of Turks 
identify as religious. . . . [I]t would be wrong to underestimate the 
role of religion in the formation of Turkish legal norms and citizens’ 
understanding of those norms.”231 His empirical research 
demonstrates a trend of increasing support for Sharia within 
Turkey.232 In Tajikistan, 97% of the Tajikistani population is Muslim, 
and an estimated 30-40% of the rural population and 5-10% of the 
urban population regularly follow Muslim practices or attend 
mosques.233 And, in Malian society, at least 90% of the people 
identify themselves as Muslims.234 This is what Nirad Chaudhuri 
described, with regard to India, as “the State is secular . . . but the 
people are not.”235
Indeed, India presents an interesting example. Notably, India 
“is ruled by a Hindu majority [and] the Hindu concept of religion as 
a social identification is accepted virtually by all.”236 How does that 
correspond with the principle of secularism? It is useful to revisit the 
229. Garlicki, supra note 199, at 468. This traditional relationship between 
state and religion is of course not unique to Islam. As Garlicki notes there:
[h]istorically speaking, almost all countries formerly had a state church, 
and the political elite were more interested in establishing and maintaining 
religious peace than ensuring religious equality. In countries where 
historical development focused on evolution rather than revolution, there 
may still be found a very close linkage between a dominant religion and 
the state, namely Scandinavian countries and the Anglican Church in 
England. However, in a majority of Continental countries, the official 
relationship between church and state eventually broke down. 
Id. 
230. JEFFREY T. KENNEY, ISLAM IN THE MODERN WORLD 448 (Jeffrey T. 
Kenney & Ebrahim Moosa eds., 2014).
231. Russell Powell, Does Shari’a Play a Role in Turkey?, 41 PEPP. L. REV.
1101, 1103-04 (2014). 
232. Id. at 1111. 
233. Karagiannis, supra note 118, at 1; see also Niyazi, supra note 124, at 
182; Stahnke & Blitt, supra note 226, at 86.
234. Leininger, supra note 148, at 821. 
235. JACOBSOHN, supra note 59, at 36.
236. Id. at 31 (quoting J. Duncan M. Derrett).
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case of R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, in which it was held that the 
principle of secularism is a basic feature of the constitution.237 The 
Supreme Court faced a challenge to the reservation of seats in the 
legislative assembly of the Himalayan state of Sikkim for the 
sangha, the community of monastics. It was argued before the Court 
that this reservation violates the secular character of the Indian 
constitution that forms part of the basic structure. The Supreme 
Court ruled that: 
[A] separate electorate for a religious denomination would be obnoxious 
to the fundamental principles of our secular Constitution. If a provision is 
made in purely on the basis of religious considerations for election of a 
member of that religious group on the basis of a separate electorate, that 
would, indeed, be wholly unconstitutional. But in the case of the Sangha, 
it is not merely a religious institution . . . the Sangha had played an 
important role in the political and social life of the Sikkimese people. In 
view of this historical association, the provisions in the matter of 
reservation of a seat for the Sangha recognises the social and political role 
for the institution more than its purely religious identity.238
Here, the official secularism of the Indian state was confronted 
with the reality that is often shaped by religious idioms and 
institutions. This leads Martijn van Beek to propose that “the 
justification offered by the Supreme Court reflects not so much a 
doubting of the importance of validity of official secularism, but the 
belief that for the Himalayan Buddhist population, religion and 
monastic institutions are of overriding significance for local culture, 
society and identity.”239
It is this clash between the legal formal entrenchment of 
secularism with the often-religious reality that is fascinating and 
carries implication for the changing nature of the principle of 
secularism. Ignoring the reality of a predominantly religious country 
by forcing a strict separation of politics and religion is simply 
untenable.240 Why is it and why does it matter? 
237. R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 324, 51.
238. Martijn van Beek, Enlightened Democracy: Normative Secularism and 
Spiritual Authority on the Margins of Indian Politics, in VARIETIES OF SECULARISM 
IN ASIA: ANTHROPOLOGICAL EXPLORATIONS OF RELIGION, POLITICS AND THE 
SPIRITUAL 75, 81-82 (Nils Ole Bubandt & Martijn van Beek eds., 2012) (quoting 
Venkatachaliah, J.).
239. Id.
240. See Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 
9 (2006). And, as Habermas suggested, this would eventually turn into a mental 
burden on those citizens who follow a faith. Id.
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Baron De Montesquieu was one of the first political 
philosophers to develop the idea of an autonomous juridical order, 
which is composed of secular laws that are human responses to 
external objective problems and are diverse in light of society’s 
changing circumstances. And already in 1748, in his famous De 
l’esprit des lois, Montesquieu famously claimed that laws: 
[S]hould be in relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of its 
soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the
natives . . . they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the 
constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their 
inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs.241
Therefore, according to Montesquieu, each community should 
design its laws or legal system according to its particular spirit: 
historical, sociological, political, and economic conditions will shape 
particular legal systems.242 Montesquieu notes that attempting to alter 
the habits and customs of a people through laws would be 
tyrannical.243 Carl Joachim Friedrich notes that “[t]his is an 
injunction which it would have been well for quite a few of our 
contemporary legislators to remember.”244
Montesquieu’s approach is very much modern and realistic. It 
makes a connection between laws that ought to apply in a given 
community and the community’s spirit. In that respect, it reminds me 
of the Volksgeist theory, coined by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the 
father of the German historical school. According to Savigny, there 
exists “an organic connection between law and the nature and 
character of a people.”245 The nature of particular legal systems 
reflects the spirit of the people who evolved them. For Savigny, law 
is not the result of an arbitrary legislator’s act; it develops as a 
response to objective powers to be found in the people’s national 
241. See CHARLES-LOUIS DE BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE 
LAWS 6 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1752) (1748).
242. See CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 105 (2d ed. 1963).
243. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 241, at 298.
We have said that the laws were the particular and precise institutions of a 
legislator, and manners and customs the institutions of a nation in general. 
Hence it follows that when these manners and customs are to be changed, 
it ought not to be done by laws; this would have too much the air of 
tyranny: it would be better to change them by introducing other manners 
and other customs.
Id. 
244. FRIEDRICH, supra note 242, at 108. 
245. See id. at 139.
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spirit and culture. In this respect, law reflects the national spirit, the 
Volksgeist. This view naturally grants utter importance to custom to 
which legislation must confirm.246
Is it therefore not dangerous to attempt to freeze indefinitely a 
norm that might last for only a while? What then, when the norm 
conflicts with the facts of reality? It appears to me that when there is 
a great discrepancy between the principles protected by 
unamendability and the values of the society—de l’esprit of the 
community to echo Montesquieu or the Volksgeist to borrow from 
Savigny—the constitution, with its unamendability, will be 
considered as a useless parchment barrier that may eventually be 
either ignored or completely replaced with a new one. As Benjamin 
Akzin sharply noted about eternity clauses: 
One understands that we deal here with provisions which the respective 
Constitution-makers hold in particular esteem and to which they would 
like to give added protection. But if this esteem is shared by the rest of the 
politically-active groups, this by itself should ensure that the standard 
procedure for constitutional amendments would protect them sufficiently; 
if, on the other hand, the demand for change were to become so strong that 
it could overcome these standard procedure, it is hardly imaginable that its 
protagonists would renounce their objectives only because the 
Constitution says that the provision is inviolable.247
Indeed, no constitutional scheme can hinder the sway of real 
forces in public life for long or, as Silvia Sutue and I have 
demonstrated with regard to the “eternal” protection of “territorial 
integrity,”248 can absolutely block extra-constitutional activity. 
Therefore, if society’s demand for change of the secular nature of the 
state is so robust, constitutional rigidity with its so-called eternal 
protection might not succeed in blocking the sought change for long, 
even if it may hinder the change for a while. 
What we now witness is challenges to constitutional secularism 
caused by the awakening of religious identity that develops into a 
major force of collective action.249 This occurs also in states in which 
246. FREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR 
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 24 (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831).
247. Benjamin Akzin, The Place of the Constitution in the Modern State, 2
ISR. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1967).
248. Yaniv Roznai & Silvia Suteu, The Eternal Territory? The Crimean 
Crisis and Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity as an Unamendable Constitutional 
Principle, 16 GERMAN L.J. 542, 542 (2015).
249. András Sajó, Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism,
in CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL, supra note 70,
at 54, 66.
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secularism is granted an absolute entrenchment in the constitution. 
Tajikistan, as earlier mentioned, is a predominantly Muslim-
populated country where, on the one hand, following the communist 
approach the constitution declares the state to be secular and, on the 
other hand, there is an evident presence of religion in the lives of its 
citizens.250 Hakim Zainiddinov is probably correct in his observation 
that: 
Being the religion of the absolute majority and an integral part of the 
social, economic, and political life of Tajikistan’s people, Islam was 
artificially and forcefully separated from the state. Perseverance on the 
same policy might cause the formation of radical religious groups or serve 
as a powerful trigger in turning moderate Islamists to extremism.251
Similar tensions exist in Turkey. Gary Jacobsohn writes about the 
fraught relationship between the Turkish eternity provision that 
shields secularism and religious movement’s demands: 
Can we then know with certainty what is and is not irrevocable when 
speaking of Turkish constitutional identity? I would suggest that an 
affirmative response ought to be received skeptically. The reason for such 
uncertainty is not unique to the Turkish case . . . instead it lies in the 
dynamic quality of identity and the dialogical process by which it is 
formed and develops. Turkey’s secularism, for example, was not a simple 
product of the imagination, but was and remains embedded in a deep 
cultural matrix from which counter-pressures to the dominant ideology 
exert a continuing, if irregular, force . . . .252
As Tyulkina pondered about the Turkish situation, “Turkey is a 
predominantly Muslim state, which makes it even harder for the 
majority of the population to accept the policy of complete 
detachment of religion from politics.”253 The eternity protection of 
secularism, coupled with substantive judicial review of constitutional 
amendments and the banning of political parties, artificially removed 
religion from the public conversation.254 According to her, “[N]o
state can succeed in building a true democracy if it imposes 
250. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
251. Zainiddinov, supra note 98, at 476-77.
252. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, If an Amendment Were Adopted Declaring the 
United States a Christian Nation, Would It Be Constitutional? Well . . . Let’s Look at 
Turkey, U. MD. CONST. L. ‘SCHMOOZE’ PAPERS (Feb. 2009), http://digitalcommons. 
law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=schmooze_papers 
[https://perma.cc/379Y-Q5YJ]. 
253. TYULKINA, supra note 81, at 176.
254. Id. at 180. 
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principles and views that people do not share and is wilfully deaf to 
what is happening in society.”255
Indeed, the abolishment of the headscarf ban in Turkey 
demonstrates that “it is not possible for democracy to indefinitely 
sustain policies of suppression and ignorance of the demands brought 
by a large proportion of the population. Rather, there is a need to 
accommodate them through dialogue, negotiation, and 
compromise.”256 As Ahmet Kuru and Alfred Stepan summarize 
events in Turkey, “[T]hese changes indicate the democratization will 
eventually result in the liberation of the state practice of laïcité in 
Turkey. Historical path dependence matters, but it does not impose a 
deterministic and unchangeable understanding of laïcité.”257 Put 
differently, when the designation of a principle as eternal conflicts 
with the spirit of society, the protected principle is destined to be 
negotiated, explicitly or implicitly.258 People’s lives move, develop, 
and change. Law—regardless of any verbal designations to the 
contrary—is no exception and is subject to these changes.259
Writing on the eternal protection of secularism in the Malian 
Constitution, Lacabanne states that in contrast with the unchangeable 
past,260 nothing is unchangeable neither in law nor in fact. The 
constitutional protection of secularism or any other eternal principle 
for that matter will continue only as long as the populations 
recognize these principles and find it necessary to adhere to them. 
However, on the day when people will abandon these principles in 
favor of a new set of values, even these eternal principles will 
255. Id. at 181.
256. Id. at 183.
257. Kuru & Stepan, supra note 97, at 104.
258. Compare Kuru & Stepan, supra note 97, at 104, with Sajó, supra note 
33, at 2428 (“In pragmatic terms the actual Western choice of constitutionalism is a 
negotiated one. It may well be that we will reach a point where religions and 
churches will become much more powerful in these negotiations, and there will be a 
moment where the religious position will prevail in constitutional law. At that 
moment it will be the choice made by religion, and not people’s choice, that will 
matter, even if that choice was endorsed by a majority consisting of fundamentalist 
believers. In the unlikely case where all people voluntarily choose religion you can’t 
say that the policies will be, for this reason, sovereign choices of the people 
consisting of sovereign, autonomous individuals. The choices will be that of (to a 
great extent pre-existing, taken for granted, non-negotiated) religion.”).
259. James A. Gardner, Legal Idealism and Constitutional Law, 10 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1964).
260. While this is true as a matter of fact, it is inaccurate as a matter of norm, 
since the law can retroactively change past legal situations. See DANIEL E. TROY,
RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 6-8 (1998).
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change. Unamendability, he correctly writes, is not one of constraint 
but of will. Law must know how to evolve with time.261
In the next Part, I review the idea of eternal law in religious and 
natural law in order to later demonstrate the paradox of using eternity 
clauses in order to shield the principle of secularism. 
III. THE CIRCLE OF ETERNITY
The final Part of this Article aims to point to a paradox 
underlying the constitutional eternity of secularism. It begins by 
expounding upon the centrality of the notion of eternity in religious 
laws, mainly in Judaism, Islam, and Christianity and in natural law 
thinking. It then briefly describes developments during the age of 
rationalization throughout the renaissance, reformation, and 
enlightenment, an age that emphasized human reason yet maintained 
a certain notion of eternity through the idea of natural rights. Finally, 
it points to a paradoxical notion in describing the constitutional 
principle of secularism as eternal, which is based on the ever-
changeable nature of secular law and rejection of transcendent 
absolute truths in the secular age. The description of certain 
constitutional principles as eternal closes the circle of eternity which 
begins with religions. 
A. Lex Temporalis & Lex Aeterna: Eternity in Religious Laws and 
Natural Laws 
The idea of eternity is strongly linked to religions. Religions
provide for eternal truths. Since God’s will is immutable, religious 
laws—defined here as laws that are rooted in the Holy Scriptures 
from which they derive their authority262—are not the product of 
deliberations or compromise and are deemed unchangeable.263 In 
these respects, they differ very much from secular laws. 
Notwithstanding the fact that even religious laws include various 
flexible mechanisms for certain adaptations,264 the conventional 
261. Lacabanne, supra note 147, at 15-16. 
262. See generally Mulford Q. Sibley, Religion and Law: Some Thoughts on 
Their Intersections, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 41 (1984) (providing an overview of the 
historical relations of law and religion). 
263. LORENZO ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 178-79 (2013). 
264. On Religion’s competing interests in providing eternal truths while 
showing sensitivity to the problems of the here and now, see ZE’EV FALK, RELIGIOUS 
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understanding is that religious laws are inherently different from
secular laws, being eternal and immutable.265
In Judaism, for example, Chapter 13 of The Book of 
Deuteronomy (the fifth book of the Torah, Mishneh Torah) opens 
with the following canonical phrase: “What thing soever I command 
you, observe to do it: thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from 
it.”266 Joseph Weiler notes that this phrase should be read together 
with the oft-repeated assertion in Deuteronomy that “this Law is a 
Chukat Olam, a law forever, for ‘a thousand generations.’”267 The 
reader, he observes, is thus instructed that a divine authority sets out 
the material content of the long and immutable list of Mosaic 
commandments (“Law of Moses”—Torat Moshe).268
In his article, “Midrash: Amendment through the Molding of 
Meaning,” Noam Zohar writes that in light of the revealed God’s 
authority, it would appear that “God has spoken: All that remains is 
to obey. . . . If the Law is invested with God’s authority, how can it 
ever be amended?”269 “It would appear that the only avenue for 
amendment must be some new revelation, wherein God Himself 
LAW BETWEEN ETERNITY AND CHANGE: ON THE DYNAMISM OF JEWISH LAW IN 
JEWISH THOUGHT AND ON JEWISH, CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
LEGAL CHANGE (Jerusalem 1986) (Heb.); JACOB KATZ, DIVINE LAW IN HUMAN 
HANDS—CASE STUDIES IN HALAKHIC FLEXIBILITY (1998).
265. Ya’akov Meron, Religious Law Between Eternity and Change, on the
Dynamism of Jewish Law in Jewish Thought and on Jewish, Christian and Moslem 
Attitudes Towards Legal Change by Ze’ev W. Falk, 65 STUDIA ISLAMICA 180, 180 
(1987) (book review); see also KATZ, supra note 264, at 7-8 (“Halakah as religious 
or rather, revealed law, is according to its own self-understanding unchangeable. . . . 
For some people, the observable changes in halakhah during the course of history 
will support the negation of its eternal validity. For others, its adaptability to 
changing conditions will guarantee its continued preservation.”); Noam J. Zohar, 
Midrash: Amendment Through the Molding of Meaning, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 307 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (demonstrating how “just as in the modern state 
specific laws can be changed or repealed without affecting the underlying 
constitution, so (arguably) can some details of Jewish law be altered without 
impinging upon the divine ‘constitution[,]’” and arguing that notwithstanding some 
conceptual and operational differences, “[H]alakhic Midrash is functionally 
equivalent to constitutional amendment.”).
266. J. H. H. Weiler, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and the Dialectic of 
Difference: An Examination of Four Dimensions of Jewish Prayer, 1 J.L. PHIL. &
CULTURE 3, 8-10 (2010).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 8-10. 
269. Zohar, supra note 265, at 308. 
310 Michigan State Law Review 2017
would announce laws supplanting His previous decrees.”270
However, Zohar notes that the tradition of Jewish law rejects divine 
intervention following the initial revelation.271 This is famously 
manifested in the Talmudic story of “Oven of Achnai.”272 Thus, the 
most amazing point with the entrenchment in Deuteronomy, Chapter 
13, is not only the fact that the community is forever bound by God’s 
eternal law, but that God also binds himself through this absolute 
entrenchment.273
It would thus appear that the notion of immutability precludes 
any amendments to the scriptural law, and allows only a limited 
scope for interpretation, which conforms and respects the initially 
received law.274 As Zohar highlights: 
[T]he core revelation functions like a constitution, setting the parameters 
for rabbinic legislation. Legal change is easily accounted for with respect 
to most of the halakhic corpus. The authority of the core “constitution” is, 
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Superficially, the story deals with the question whether a certain type of 
oven is susceptible to ritual impurity. At a deeper level, the issue is whether the 
authority to decide Jewish Law resides on earth or “in the heavens.” According to 
the story, Rabbi Eliezer brought forward various arguments to support his position, 
but the rest of the sages disagreed with him. He then told them: “If the Halakha 
agrees with me, let this carob tree prove it!” The carob tree was immediately torn a 
hundred cubits out of its place—others affirm, four hundred cubits. “No proof can 
be brought from a carob tree,” they retorted. Then he said, “If the Halakha agrees 
with me let the stream of water prove it.” And so the stream of water flowed 
backwards. “No proof can be brought from a stream of water,” they replied. He then 
insisted, “If the Halacha agrees with me, let the walls of the schoolhouse prove it,” 
at which point the walls tended to fall. But Rabbi Joshua rebuked them saying: 
“When scholars are engaged in halachic dispute, what right have you to interfere?” 
Hence they did not fall in honor of Rabbi Joshua, nor did they resume the upright 
position in honor of Rabbi Eliezer, and they are still standing thus tending. Then he 
said to them, “If the Halakha agrees with me, let it be proved by Heaven.” 
Whereupon a Heavenly voice cried out: “Why do you dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, 
seeing that in all matters the Halakha agrees with him.” But Rabbi Joshua arose and 
exclaimed: “it [the Torah] is not in Heaven” Deuteronomy 30:12. What did he mean 
by this? Rabbi Yermiah said: “That the Torah had already been given at Mt. Sinai; 
therefore we pay no attention to a Heavenly voice, because you have long since 
written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, ‘One must follow the majority.’” Exodus 23:2.
See KATZ, supra note 264, at 261-62; HOWARD SCHWARTZ, TREE OF SOULS: THE 
MYTHOLOGY OF JUDAISM 67 (2004). 
273. Weiler, supra note 266, at 11. 
274. Zohar, supra note 265, at 309. The Maimonides, Zohar notes, 
distinguished between a core revelation that can never be changed and the remainder 
of the law—traced to rabbinic implementation—and subject to constant 
reevaluation. Id. at 315.
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however, held to be absolute: Any change or amendment of the revealed 
Torah is expressly ruled out—even if authored by God Himself.275
In rabbinic Judaism, he writes, “[T]here is no authority that can 
override the absolute commitment to the initial revelation.”276
Although the meaning of text is ultimately flexible, it is “eternally 
fixed.”277
Menachem Elon, a leading authority on Jewish law and former 
justice at the Israeli Supreme Court, summarizes: 
What is the basic norm of Jewish law? It is the fundamental norm that 
everything set forth in the Torah, i.e., the Written Law, is binding on the 
Jewish legal system. The basic norm of Jewish law is thus more than the 
source of a chain of authority. It is also intertwined with the substantive 
content of the Written Law as the permanent constitution of the Jewish 
legal system—a constitution not subject to modification, either by addition 
or subtraction. This norm is the source of authority and the starting point 
for the entire Jewish legal system in all its periods, changes, and 
developments; it authorizes the legal sources of Jewish law to serve as 
effective means for continued creativity and development.278
It is God’s command itself, as embodied in the Torah, which was 
given to Moses at Sinai. Since the “Torah is from Heaven[,]” (Torah 
min ha-shamayim) it carries an immutable eternal character. 
Similar to Judaism, within Islamic Law (Sharia), the 
transcendent law is eternal and unchangeable.279 The Quran, one of 
the formal sources of Islamic Law,280 is the most sacred source of 
law as it is believed to contain God’s direct revelations to the 
Prophet Muhammad. “These were embodied in permanent written 
form in the Quran shortly after the death of Muhammad in 632 
CE.”281 Ann Lambton writes that in light of its divine character, 
275. Id. at 316. 
276. Id. at 318. 
277. Id.
278. MENACHEM ELON, 1 JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 232 
(Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994) (emphasis added). Interestingly, 
in a footnote, Elon compares this integration of the basic norm with substantive 
content to modern constitutions that protect basic constitutions from amendments. 
He provides there the examples of France, Italy, Brazil, and Norway. See id. at n.10. 
279. ASHK P. DAHLÉN, ISLAMIC LAW, EPISTEMOLOGY AND MODERNITY:
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN 50 (2003).
280. The other sources are the sunna (verbally transmitted record prophet 
Muhammad’s teachings), TL\ƗV (analogical reasoning), and LMPƗޏ VFKRODUO\
consensus). 
281. JONATHAN ERCANBRACK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIC LAW IN 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 23 (2015).
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Sharia is pre-existing and eternal.282 Likewise, Noel Coulson 
qualifies Sharia as “a rigid and immutable system, embodying norms 
of an absolute and eternal validity, which are not susceptible to 
modification by any legislative authority.”283 And Ron Geaves refers 
to the Quran as a text “deemed to be the eternal and complete 
revelation of God to all humankind.”284 Again, in light of its divine 
source (as it is legislated by God), Sharia is above human law; it is 
an immutable and rigid system of law.285 In divine ideology, God is 
“the first and eternal legislator.”286
This idea of eternal law is a central aspect of Christianity, as 
most dominantly manifested in the development of legal philosophy 
at the Christian Middle Ages. Perhaps most prominent is St. 
Augustine, who is “in truth the fulfilment and perfection of Christian
antiquity, its last and its greatest thinker, its spiritual practitioner and 
tribune.”287 Augustine is “the father of medieval Catholicism.”288 In 
his work, the Church—as a higher community—stands above the 
polis, above the civitas. The civitas Dei, the city of God, exists in 
heaven and not in earth, yet it is represented earthly by the 
community of faithful, which is visibly represented by the church. 
The church is imbedded in the civitas terrena, the secular community 
of mankind, which is organized into different political bodies. There 
is a division between the two spheres; the civitas Dei and especially 
the church, its representative on earth, is responsible for realization 
of the higher values. The secular political community, the civitas 
terrena and its sectors, in contrast, remain responsible for the 
ordering and upholding of peace. The state is subjected to the 
measures of justice represented by the Church, which rests upon 
282. ANN K. S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEORY: THE JURISTS xiv 
(1981).
283. N. J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 5 (1964); see also Rudolph 
Peters & Peri Bearman, Introduction: The Nature of the Sharia, in THE ASHGATE 
RESEARCH COMPANION TO ISLAMIC LAW 3 (Rudolph Peters & Peri Bearman eds., 
2014). 
284. RON GEAVES, ISLAM TODAY 43-44 (2010).
285. See, e.g., ERCANBRACK, supra note 281, at 31 (“[T]he eternal Law of 
God remains an absolute obligation for the individual.”). 
286. See DAHLÉN, supra note 279DWFLWLQJ0DKGƯ%Ɨ]DUJƗQ
287. See FRIEDRICH, supra note 242, at 35 (citing ERNST TROELTSCH,
AUGUSTIN, DIE CHRISTLICHE ANTIKE UND DAS MITTELALTER (1915)). 
288. F. J. E. RABY, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN–LATIN POETRY: FROM THE 
BEGINNINGS TO THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES 20 (1927). See also CHARLES 
HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST: FROM THE 
GREEKS TO THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 154-60 (1932). 
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divine revelation; and therefore is in a higher position to judge 
whether a specific rule or government is acting justly or not. Carl 
Friedrich notes that this split that created an interdependence of state 
and church led centuries later to the separation of church and state.289
This concept of justice as limits to law is a recurring idea in 
Augustine, who writes that “Mihi lex esse von videtur, quae justa 
non fuerit (‘it seems to me that that which would not be just is not 
law’).”290 Law, not only as an individual statute—but as a whole—
must be understood as an emanation of justice.291 However, there is 
still a clear distinction between law and morals. Positive or ordinary 
law (lex temporalis) punishes for the violation of a particular rule 
ordering the peace. It is therefore limited since it only prevents evils 
but does not make men good. And most importantly, positive law 
relates to the unimportant realm of this world. The truly important 
realm is that of eternal life that is subject to the eternal law (lex 
aeterna). But there is an important link: The eternal law of God 
limits all positive law that the latter may not transgress without 
losing its quality of law.292
St. Augustine’s writings had a dominant influence on Thomas 
Aquinas, the most influential philosopher of the Middle Ages. In his 
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas distinguishes between different kinds of 
law. The first is eternal law, which is the reason of divine wisdom 
that governs the whole community of the universe. “[S]ince the 
divine reason’s conception of things is not subject to time but is 
eternal,” Aquinas writes, “this kind of law must be called the eternal 
law.”293 Then, there is natural law, which is “participation in the 
eternal law by rational creatures;”294 is that part of the divine law that 
is revealed to man through reason. It is the participation in eternal 
law typical for rational creatures.295 Natural law, apart from its basic 
289. FRIEDRICH, supra note 242, at 35-39.
290. Id. at 39 (citing AUGUSTINE, DE CIVITAS DEI xix. 21). 
291. Id. In his translation of The Two Cities, Alan Ryan, translates this as 
“where, therefore, there is no true justice there can be no right.” See ALAN RYAN, ON
AUGUSTINE—THE TWO CITIES 196 (2016).
292. See FRIEDRICH, supra note 242, at 40.
293. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II [The Summa of 
Theology, 1269-1270], in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 30, 46 
(Paul E. Sugmund trans. & ed., 1988).
294. Id. 
295. Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law as a “Work of Reason”: 
Understanding the Metaphysics of Participated Theonomy, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 41, 51 
(2010). Rhonheimer mentions that the notion that “moral life is based upon ‘the 
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first principles, is changeable.296 Thus there is an “immutable 
ontological foundation” to moral principles.297 Natural law, as a 
general norm above positive law, can bring Christian justice.298
Finally, there are human laws, which are those particular dispositions 
arrived at by human reason.299 What if a human law deviates from 
the right reason? Then, according to Aquinas, it is: 
an unjust law, and thus does not have the character of a law but rather that 
of an act of violence. However, even an unjust law to the extent that it 
maintains the appearance of law because of the authority of the one who 
makes it is derived in this respect from the eternal law.300
Human positive law implements the divine eternal law and natural 
law by dealing with the specific problems of a concrete 
community.301 Importantly, for Aquinas, human law—as a dictate of 
reason that directs human action—can be changed. His words are 
worth citing in full: 
Reason may cause laws to be changed because it seems to be the nature of 
human reason to progress by stages from the less perfect to the more 
perfect. Thus we see that in the speculative science the teachings of the 
early philosophers were inadequate, and later their successors improved
them. The same thing is true in practical affairs. Those who first tried to 
discover something useful for the human community were not able to take 
account of everything by themselves and established institutions that were 
inadequate in many respects. These were then modified by their 
successors who set up institutions that proved to be less deficient from the 
point of view of the public interest. 
Those whose actions are regulated by the law may cause a law to be 
changed if the circumstances have changed that make different laws 
appropriate for different circumstances.302
Accordingly, human laws change due to the progress of the 
nature of human reason and the changing circumstances. For 
Aquinas, secular authority is subject to spiritual authority; and it is
the church—the guardian of spirituality—that ought to judge the 
impression in us of the knowledge of the eternal law’” is affirmed also in Aquinas’ 
De libero arbitrio. Id. at 45. 
296. AQUINAS, supra note 293, at 51-52. 
297. LUIS CORTEST, THE DISFIGURED FACE: TRADITIONAL NATURAL LAW AND 
ITS ENCOUNTER WITH MODERNITY 15 (2008). 
298. FRIEDRICH, supra note 242, at 43.
299. Id. at 44. 
300. AQUINAS, supra note 293, at 48.
301. FRIEDRICH, supra note 242, at 44.
302. AQUINAS, supra note 293, at 56. 
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actions of the prince: “Kings must be subject to priests.”303 If the 
princes fail to act in accordance with Christian views, their 
commands cease to be laws and must be disobeyed—“Man is bound 
to obey secular rules to the extent that the order of justice requires 
. . . [but if rulers] command things to be done which are unjust, their 
subjects are not obliged to obey them; except, perhaps, in certain 
special cases, when it is a matter of avoiding scandal or some 
particular danger.”304
The idea of an eternal aspect of law is recurring in Christian 
theology. Pope Leo XIII, for example, wrote that “the law of nature 
is the same thing as the eternal law, implanted in rational creatures, 
and inclining them to their right action and end; and can be nothing 
else but the eternal reason of God.”305 For Pope Leo, true liberty 
belongs to those who obey God.306 This idea of immutability also 
appeared in the writings of Pope John: “universal, absolute and 
immutable [order] in its principles—finds its sources in the true, 
personal and transcendent God.”307 According to the early Church, 
“Temporal institutions were sacred only so far as they conformed to 
eternal standards.”308
The idea of a natural law as representing an immutable idea of 
justice goes back to the Greeks.309 After identifying laws of nature 
that control the cycles of daytime and seasons, the Greeks explored 
whether similar natural laws govern the human conduct. Through 
their reason, humans have an inherent ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong. Nature is the order of reason that is expressed in the 
form of fundamental laws, and these laws are superior to the customs 
of particular societies.310 The Greeks have distinguished between 
local positive law, which is changeable, and what is just by nature, 
which is “unwritten, universal, eternal, and immutable.”311 The 
identity of natural law (jus natural) with reason and human nature 
was a key assumption of Stoicism, which considered morality’s 
303. FRIEDRICH, supra note 242, at 47. 
304. Id.
305. CORTEST, supra note 297, at 71. 
306. Id. at 72 (“[T]he eternal law of God is the sole standard and rule of 
human liberty . . . .”).
307. Id. at 87.
308. Gardner, supra note 259, at 8-9.
309. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 173-74 (1958); MARTIN 
LOUGHLIN, SWORD & SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
LAW & POLITICS 10 (2000).
310. LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 10.
311. Gardner, supra note 259, at 3.
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positive content in harmony with nature, as adapted to human nature.
Nature, human nature, and reason were all one in a way the men 
participated with the Gods through their rational capacity.312
This idea was manifested by Cicero who introduced the 
Stoicism to Rome. For Cicero, there is a universal natural law, which 
is derived from the divine governance and the rational nature of 
humans. This is the universal constitution; it is similar everywhere 
and binding, without a change, on all humans. No conflicting law 
can be considered as law.313 As Cicero writes in De Legibus (On the 
Laws): “There is indeed a true law (lex), right reason, agreeing with 
nature and diffused among all, unchanging, everlasting . . .”314 From 
Cicero the idea of natural law arrived to Roman jurists, and perhaps 
even more importantly, to the fathers of the church, and Cicero 
works were cited countlessly throughout the Middle Ages. Therefore 
the juridical meaning of “natural right” and “natural law” (ius 
natural), introduced into medieval moral philosophy and theology, 
had a clear moral connotation and was about natural reason.315
To conclude, immutable principles are strongly connected to 
the religious context of eternal law.316 Like religious laws, natural 
laws are immutable in some sense. Natural law, as right reason, was 
considered permanent. The classical distinction between divine law, 
natural law, and human, or positive, law is the unchangeable and 
eternal nature of the former and the changeable and temporal nature 
of the latter.
B. Secularism and the Age of Rationalization 
During the Middle Ages, sovereignty was a mark of superiority 
signified through some divine source. With the emergence of the 
modern idea of the State, however, political power became 
differentiated from heavenly authority, and sovereignty was 
312. Id. at 4-5. Stoic natural law, however, “[W]as conceived as being 
identical with the eternal law of the cosmos.” Rhonheimer, supra note 295, at 45.
313. GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 178-79 (3d ed. 
1963) (citing CICERO, THE REPUBLIC, II, 22) (Heb.).
314. H. VERLAN ANDERSEN, THE MORAL BASIS OF A FREE SOCIETY 5 (1995) 
(citing DE LEGIBUS (ON THE LAWS) II, 4, 10). 
315. Rhonheimer, supra note 295, at 42.
316. Some scholars, such as Michael Crowe, the idea of an “immutable” 
truth is illusionary since morel precepts are time-conditioned and culture-bound. See
MICHAEL BERTRAM CROWE, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF THE NATURAL LAW 288 
(1977).
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transformed into an earthly symbol of authority.317 How, then, can 
the political order be justified? In the sixteenth century, Bodin had 
asserted that sovereignty is the highest power of command that 
constitutes “the absolute and perpetual power of the 
commonwealth.”318 However, for Bodin it was still God at the apex 
of the system.319 It is thanks to the contribution of the seventeenth-
century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius that advanced secular political 
theory. In his De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius contends that laws 
would maintain their objective validity “even if we should concede 
that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that 
there is no God.”320 Grotius believed that given the human nature, 
natural law precepts followed as a matter of logic; a disposition that 
“has been implanted in us partly by reason, partly by unbroken 
tradition.”321 Grotius claimed that law embodies principles of just 
conduct that are revealed through the exercise of powers of reason 
and tradition.322 The idea of law as a set of principles of just conduct 
continues to exert a powerful influence over modern thinking. 
Grotius identified the rationalistic conception law as reason, or of 
right. Richard Tuck, for example, notes that De Jure Belli ac Pacis
“is in fact the first reconstruction of an actual legal system in terms 
of rights rather than laws,” and therefore “the true ancestor of all the 
modern codes which have rights of various kinds at their centre.”323
The idea of secular political order was central to Thomas 
Hobbes. Applying natural sciences to the study of social and political 
phenomenon, Hobbes conceived human action in terms of physical 
317. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1050-3300 at 188-
89 (1964). On the secularization of government within mediaeval origins, see
MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 37-46 (2010).
318. JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 87 (1576); see BODIN,
ON SOVEREIGNTY 1 (Julian H. Franklin ed., 1992). On Bodin’s method, see
LOUGHLIN, supra note 317, at 56-73. 
319. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 10 (Julian H. Franklin ed., 1992) 
(explaining that “if we say that to have absolute power is not to be subject to any 
law at all, no prince of this world will be sovereign, since every earthly prince is 
subject to the laws of God and of nature and to various human laws that are common 
to all peoples”).
320. HUGO GROTIUS, PROLEGOMENA TO THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE § 11 
[1625] (Edward Dumbald ed., Liberal Arts Press, 1957). 
321. Id.
322. LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 10-11. 
323. RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT 66 (1976). 
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matter in motion.324 In Leviathan, he describes the state as an 
artificial construct; using mechanical metaphors to explain the nature 
of the state like those “engines that move themselves by springs and 
wheels as doth a watch,”325 a metaphor that implies that the sovereign 
is a human not a God-given construct.326
The idea of natural law as a set of objective moral principles
that should guide our actions is central to John Locke’s philosophy.
Locke writes that: 
Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as 
well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions, must . . . 
be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that 
is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation 
of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it.327
Locke believed in natural law as that which expresses what we 
ought to do and which therefore guides our actions. And for Locke, 
“[T]he end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and 
enlarge freedom.”328 The purpose of political society is to maintain 
and extend natural freedom. Individuals, he claimed, possess certain 
inalienable natural rights. This idea of natural rights had an 
enormous influence on late eighteenth century developments, as 
evident by the Declaration of Right of Virginia,329 the American 
Declaration of Independence,330 and the French Declaration of the 
324. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY (1656); see
DAVID JOHNSON, THE RHETORIC OF LEVIATHAN: THOMAS HOBBES AND THE POLITICS 
OF CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION (1986); QUENTIN SKINNER, REASON AND RHETORIC 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 327-75 (1996) (arguing that in Leviathan, Hobbes 
attempts to bring together the methods of science with the rhetoric techniques of 
Renaissance humanism). 
325. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 9 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1996) (1651). 
326. LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 33.
327. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II § 135 (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690). 
328. Id. at § 57.
329. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 1 (Va. 1776) (“[A]ll men are by nature 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they 
enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their 
posterity.”).
330. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed 
. . . .”).
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Rights of Man and Citizen,331 all of which recognize rights as 
existing prior to the sovereign power and the constitutional order. 
Of course, the claim that all humans have natural rights needs 
some foundation.332 One basis would be, of course, an appeal to a 
divine religious creator. In a secular age, another basis would be to 
appeal to an unchanging human nature, an unlikely option, as 
Loughlin mentions, given the vagaries of human history.333 Another 
alternative is to discover the structure of ethical order embedded
within human reason itself.334 In his Rights of Man, Thomas Paine 
explains that these rights are natural because they “appertain to man 
in right of his existence.”335 Since government is now being 
reconstructed in accordance with the principle of natural rights, 
Paine calls the present age “the Age of reason.”336
Modern secularism was therefore developed through the 
increasing confidence in human capabilities, reason, and progress, 
which have emerged during the Italian Renaissance, the German 
Reformation’s distrust toward religion, and the French 
Enlightenment.337 Indeed, a central feature of the Renaissance (1350-
1600)338 was the focus on the individual as a free, dignified, and 
rational human being. It is also when the secular approach to politics 
331. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. 1 
(1789) (Fr.) (“Men are born and [always continue,] free and equal in [respect of 
their] rights”); see also id. at art. 2 (“The aim of [all] political association is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are 
liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.”).
332. Some, of course, have claimed the idea of ‘natural’ rights is fictional. 
See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69 (Univ. 
Notre Dame Press 2d ed. 1984) (1981) (“[T]here are no such rights, and belief in 
them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.”); Gregory J. Walters, Macintyre 
or Gewirth? Virtue, Rights, and The Problem of Moral Indeterminacy, in
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 183, 
187 (William Sweet ed., 2003).
333. LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 201.
334. Id. (referring to Emmanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch, in KANT POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1991)). 
335. THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in RIGHTS OF MAN COMMON SENSE AND 
OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 119 (Mark Philip ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
336. Id. at 321. 
337. MARBANIANG, supra note 59, at 11-12; see also DOMENIC 
MARBANIANG, THE STORY AND MEANING OF SECULARISM (2012).
338. Renaissance was the rebirth of classical humanism, spreading from Italy 
to Germany, France, England, and Spain in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
See MARVIN PERRY, WESTERN CIVILIZATION, A BRIEF HISTORY 186-213 (10th ed. 
2012).
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has been further developed by Niccolo Machiavelli.339 German 
Reformation (1517-1648) represents the era of privatization of 
religion and freedom from Papacy.340 And, a central feature of the 
Age of Enlightenment (1715-1789) was the confidence in human 
reason. It is reason, rather than religion, that would guide us between 
truth and falsity. As Jean Jacques Rousseau emphasized in his Social 
Contract, when referring to Grotius’ writings, “These principles are 
not . . . based on the authority of poets, but derived from the nature 
of reality and based on reason.”341 Enlightenment thinkers believed 
that it is reason instead of religion that should be the reference point 
for knowledge. And of course the scientific revolution with 
Galileo,342 Newton,343 and Darwin’s Origin of Species,344 left no place 
for God. 
Immanuel Kant described the Enlightenment as “our release 
from our self-imposed tutelage.”345 Therefore, Enlightenment is also 
called “the Age of Reason” by reflecting the supremacy of reason 
over faith or revelation.346 But there is still an element of eternity; 
Natural rights, as developed in the eighteenth century, were 
considered natural, inherent, universal, and eternal.347
339. See his classical work THE PRINCE (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988), which represents a shift from a political theory 
based on ethics and metaphysics to realism.
340. See generally TOM SCOTT, THE EARLY REFORMATION IN GERMANY:
BETWEEN SECULAR IMPACT AND RADICAL VISION (2013). 
341. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 20 (G.D.H. Cole 
trans., Cosimo 2008) (1762).
342. See, e.g., RIVKA FELDHAY, GALILEO AND THE CHURCH (1995). 
343. Newton demonstrated that the physical universe was governed by 
certain universal and eternal principles. See ISAAC NEWTON, A TREATISE OF THE 
SYSTEM OF THE WORLD 5 (1728). 
344. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (David 
Knight ed., Routledge 2003) (1859).
345. ALISTER E. MCGRATH, THE MAKING OF MODERN GERMAN 
CHRISTOLOGY 14 (Inter-Varsity Press 2d ed. 1994). 
346. See id. at 15.
347. Gardner, supra note 259, at 15-16. Martin Loughlin writes that: 
The idea of a natural law operating on a higher level than the conventions 
of politics seems intelligible only when linked to the existence of a 
creator: having designed an ordered universe, God placed humans in the 
unique position of being able to reflect on the rational order of the cosmos. 
Modern natural rights theories have tried to avoid this dependence of law 
on theology by devising a conception of law as a construction of reason.
See LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 10.
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In the next Section, I wish to present the challenge, how the 
enlightenment rejection of imposition corresponds with 
constitutional eternity or unamendability. 
C. The Paradox of Modern Constitutional Eternity 
In his book A Secular Europe, Lorenzo Zucca distinguishes 
between religious, natural, and secular law. The three belong to 
discrete domains of analysis: religious laws belong to the sacred, 
which cannot be proved; natural laws belong to the natural, which 
can be proved; and secular laws belong to the juridical.348 In 
opposition to religious laws, secular laws do not rely on divine 
authority. And in contrast with natural law, they are secular since 
they are created by humans. Most importantly, secular laws, in 
contrast with religious laws, are produced by deliberations and 
compromises in order to obtain a certain degree of social harmony 
and order, and are contingent and changeable. Their purpose is to 
create a framework within which all individuals living in a territory 
can organize their life in an orderly and peaceful manner. Secular 
laws thus have the goal of stabilizing competing forces in society in 
order to achieve and maintain a well-ordered society. But in contrast 
with religious laws, they can aim at the goal of a well-ordered 
society (which in itself may take a variety of forms), while 
preserving an infinite number of paths that can lead there.349
Secular laws, in contrast with religious laws, offer a space for 
disagreement deliberations, as they do not rely on a divine command. 
This is surely correct with regard to positivism such as Hans 
Kelzen’s pure theory of law, for whom law excludes any influence of 
religious and natural laws.350 “In the age of secularism,” David 
Dyzenhaus notes, “the only candidate we have for rightness is the 
beliefs we have in the light of our deliberations about our 
348. ZUCCA, supra note 263, at 179-80. Zucca claims there that the juridical 
domain has primacy; when religious groups clash, the only possible way to solve the 
conflict is through secular laws; because they cannot compromise on their tents of 
faith. And, when scientists clash about diverging scientific paradigms, they resort to 
quasi-juridical forms in order to establish which version is authoritative. Id.
Similarly, the juridical domain is necessary to solve conflicts between religious and 
natural laws. Id.
349. ZUCCA, supra note 263, at 178-82.
350. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 
2003); HANS KELSEN, SECULAR RELIGION (Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner &
Klaus Zeleny eds., 2011) (arguing against the rise of theology in the West). 
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experience.”351 But constitutional eternity seeks to impose an 
unchangeable principle on society. It allegedly leaves no place for 
disagreement or deliberations. For example, the Turkish absolute 
entrenchment of secularism in Article 4 prohibits even proposing
amendments to the characteristics of the Republic thereby placing 
the bar at a very early stage.352
András Sajó recently claimed that certain fundamental 
demands of constitutionalism require secularism.353 “When 
constitutional law insists on secularism,” Sajó claims, “it insists on 
the possibility of a reason-based political society. . . . The secular 
constitutional state is presupposed to exist as a political community 
of citizens exercising their rational faculties.”354 Without the 
requirement of public reason, which requires the citizens to think 
critically, democracy is meaningless.355 I have no intentions in 
challenging Sajó’s strong and, to my mind, compelling normative 
claim. My aim is much less ambitious as I merely wish to point to a 
certain paradox of shielding secularism in a supposedly eternal 
manner. 
As Sajó himself recognizes, a historical inter-connection exists 
between secularism and popular sovereignty. Secularism emerged as 
a denial of the divine power of the king as a sovereign, in favor of 
popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty means that all power in the 
state originates from the people (thus it cannot originate from the 
sacred): “[P]opular sovereignty emanates from individuals; it exists 
as the aggregate of individual choices, and such autonomous 
individual choices serve as the foundation of democratic society.”356
But constitutional unamendability allegedly blocks popular 
sovereignty as it places certain principles above everyday ordinary 
351. David Dyzenhaus, Legitimacy of Legality, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 129, 167 
(1996).
352. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
353. Sajó, supra note 249, at 67.
354. Id. at 70; see also Sajó, supra note 33, at 2401 (“Constitutionalism 
exists only where political powers do not ground their public affecting decisions on 
transcendental concerns.”). 
355. Sajó, supra note 249, at 74. For Sajó, robust secularism that would not 
allow privileged religious knowledge to dictate public decisions does not mean that 
such positions cannot be held and represented in the public sphere. Id. Thus, when it 
comes to public discourse, such as legislative decision-making, religious people are 
free to make arguments in public. Id.
356. Id. at 75; see also id. at 605. On the origins of popular sovereignty, see 
DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
(2016).
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and even constitutional politics. It is therefore in clear tension with 
democracy.357 As Nadia Urbinati claimed, “Democracy’s procedures 
of decision-making presume a permanent legal changeability because 
they assume that citizen’s opinions are the core of political 
legitimacy.”358 According to Urbinati, what makes a society 
democratic and secular is the permanent tension between the civil 
and religious, a tension that is neither repressed nor resolved once 
and for all.359 Constitutional unamendability is the strongest form of 
constitutionalism as it blocks democratic avenues for change and 
rejects majoritarian democrats. In that respect, Nimer Sultany is 
correct in his observation that secularists prioritize constitutionalism 
over democracy in the sense that they reject simple-majoritarian 
democracy as a justification for applying religious law, even at the 
cost of ignoring popular will.360 Of course, the same paradox of 
constitutional democracy exists even when the constitution protects 
the principle of democracy itself from change. It limits democracy in 
order to protect democracy. This is why I have argued that 
unamendability should be viewed as a tool averting the possibility of 
democracy’s self-destruction rather than as an undemocratic 
mechanism.361 Indeed, when unamendable or eternity provisions 
protect democracy, “[T]heir basic underlying idea is that of a 
‘militant democracy’—evincing the fear that unfettered democracy 
357. See, e.g., MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 2
(2009) (claiming that entrenchment “betrays one of democracy’s most attractive 
legacies: the ability to modify law”); Richard Albert, Counterconstitutionalism, 31 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 1, 47-48 (2008) (arguing that unamendability undermines the basic 
promise of democratic constitutionalism since it restricts the constitutional 
possibilities open to the people governed by the Constitution); Richard Albert, 
Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 667 (2010) (“deny citizens the 
democratic right to amend their own constitution and in so doing divest them for the 
basic sovereign rights of popular choice and continuing self-definition”). For a 
summary of the challenges to constitutional unamendability and a reply see Yaniv 
Roznai, Necrocracy or Democracy? Assessing Objections to Constitutional 
Unamendability, in AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTION? UNAMENDABILITY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2.
358. Nadia Urbinati, The Context of Secularism: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Post-Secular Argument, in CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS 
REVIVAL 20, supra note 70.
359. Id. at 20-21. 
360. Nimer Sultany, Against Conceptualism: Islamic Law, Democracy, and 
Constitutionalism in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 435, 451 
(2013). 
361. ROZNAI, supra note 11, at 191.
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will allow its own destruction.”362 They reflect some kind of what I 
term “Amendophobia”: the fear that the amendment provision would 
be abused to abrogate the core values of society.363 “Militant 
democracy,” Tyulkina claims, “is a useful, practical tool to guard 
constitutionally recognized principles, including even the principle 
of secularism; however, it cannot be used as justification to stifle 
debate on the role of religion and the relationship between state and 
religious groups indefinitely.”364 Indeed, the deeper paradox I wish to 
emphasize exists when unamendability is used to shield the principle 
of secularism. 
“Secularism,” writes Domenic Marbaniang, “shifts the focus 
from religion to other ‘temporal’ and ‘this-worldly’ things, striving 
to change the present for a better and brighter future.”365 In fact, the 
word secularism is derived from the Latin word saeculum, meaning a 
generation or this age. The Latin form saecularis means “worldly.”366
The idea of “this age” or “generation” goes counter to the 
constitutional idea of unamendability or eternity that is supra-
temporal and cross-generational. The principle of secularism is 
interconnected with the idea of temporality, as the secular concept 
itself was developed through the division of knowledge to “upper 
story,” which belongs to theology and the “lower story,” which 
belongs to philosophy and the temporal.367 Secularism rejects the 
sacred and transcendent worldview.368 If secularism rejects the 
sacred, how then can it claim for eternity? 
Surely, the mechanism of constitutional unamendability or 
eternity is completely logical when a religious state protects core 
religious laws or principles because, as reviewed above, the core 
religious laws are considered eternal. For example, Iran’s 
“Supplementary Fundamental Laws” of 1907 specified that Article 2, 
stating generally that laws must never be contrary to the sacred 
362. Roznai, supra note 8, at 811. On “militant democracy” see the classical 
study: Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, II, 31 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 417, 638 (1937). For contemporary debates, see, e.g., ANDRÁS SAJÓ,
MILITANT DEMOCRACY (András Sajó ed., 2004); THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’
PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES (Markus Thiel ed., 2009); Gregory H. Fox & 
Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1995). 
363. Roznai, supra note 8, at 776.
364. TYULKINA, supra note 81, at 181.
365. MARBANIANG, supra note 59, at 1.
366. Id. at 3.
367. Id.
368. MARBANIANG, supra note 59, at 5 (citing JOHN DESROCHERS, 2 THE 
INDIA WE WANT TO BUILD 368 (1995)).
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precepts of Islam, “shall continue unchanged until the appearance of 
His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad 
Advent!),”369 thus requiring the intervention of a super-human factor, 
namely the advent of the Twelfth Imam, in order to allow its 
amendment. Indeed, a state’s religious character is often expressly 
protected from amendments.370 Others do so implicitly. Like the 
implicit protection of secularism in India, in Pakistan, it was declared 
by the Supreme Court that Pakistan’s Constitution has salient 
features—“Federalism[,] . . . [p]arliamentary [f]orm of Government 
blended with Islamic provisions”—that are beyond the amendment 
power.371
True, the core of religious thinking is considered unchangeable. 
But since the medieval times, we moved to the periods of 
enlightenment, rationality, modern constitution-making based upon 
the notion of popular sovereignty, and democratic deliberative 
mechanisms of decision-making. A revisit to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court’s decision, which invalidated constitutional 
amendments in the headscarf decision for protecting the principle of 
secularism, could be useful. The Constitutional Court states that: 
The secularism principle which has its intellectual origins in the Age of 
Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment, is a common value of 
contemporary democracies. According to this principle, political and legal 
structures rely on the national choices that are a product of participatory 
democratic processes based on rationalism and scientific methodology. . . . 
Legal arrangements based on religious orders, rather than the national will 
that arises within a participatory democratic process, make individual 
liberty and the democratic process arising from such liberty impossible. 
. . . Thus, contemporary democracies deny claims about an absolute 
reality, stand with rationalism against dogmas and prevent religion from 
369. HELEN MILLER DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONS, ELECTORAL LAWS, TREATIES OF 
STATES IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 118 (1953).
370. For example, many Arabic and Muslim states expressly protect Islam as 
the state’s religion from any revisions. See THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Jan.
26, 2004, art. 149; CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
ALGERIA 1989, art. 178; CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN May 26, 1973, 
arts. 2, 6; QANUNI ASSAASSI IRAN [IRANIAN CONSTITUTION] 1906, art. 2 QANUNI 
ASSAASSI IRAN [IRANIAN CONSTITUTION] 1979, art. 177; MOROCCO CONSTITUTION 
2011, art. 175.
371. Achakzai v. Fede’n of Pakistan, (1997) 1997 PLD (SC) 426 (Pak.); see, 
e.g., MARTIN LAU, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN 81-88 
(2006). 
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becoming politicized and an instrument of governance by separating 
religious and governmental affairs.372
And here lies the paradox. If modern constitutionalism in 
liberal democracies is indeed based on the “national choices that are 
a product of participatory democratic processes” and truly “deny 
claims about an absolute reality,” then should not the method of 
constitutional unamendability or eternity of secularism itself be 
objected? 
Secularism, Harvey Cox claims, “[F]unctions very much like a 
new religion.”373 This is apparent with the mechanism of 
constitutional eternity. But protecting secularism through an eternal 
protection is paradoxical since, in a Schmittian political theology 
manner, it is a secularization of religious rationales—the existence of 
absolute truth that carries an immutable form.374 As Gottfried Dietze 
describes it, providing in the constitution that certain principles are 
immune from legal change is the transmutation of natural law ideas 
to positive law.375
Of course, the power of eternity in religions derives from a 
supra-human divine source. For example, in the case of God’s law 
and the entrenchment in Deuteronomy 13, there is not prima facie
difficulty; Man should not be able to deviate from the 
commandments of God. As Oren Gross correctly writes, “[T]he 
notion of amendment . . . becomes unbearable when the author of the 
constitution is . . . truly divine. . . . Thus, a theory of constitutional 
amendment which expressly exists in secular constitutional regimes, 
372. See Roznai & Yolcu, supra note 82, at 187 (citing Headscarf Decision 
of 2008, supra note 94, at 139). 
373. HANS SCHWARZ, METHOD AND CONTEXT AS PROBLEMS FOR 
CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY: DOING THEOLOGY IN AN ALIEN WORLD 49 (1991) 
(citing HARVEY COX, THE SECULAR CITY—SECULARISM AND URBANIZATION IN 
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (1965)). 
374. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY—FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON 
THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George Schwab trans. 2005). 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in 
which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, 
whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent 
lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition 
of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.
Id. On Schmitt’s political theology see, e.g., CARLO GALLI, JANUS’S GAZE: ESSAYS 
ON CARL SCHMITT (Adam Sitze ed., Amanda Minervini trans., Duke Univ. Press 
2015).
375. Gottfried Dietze, Natural Law in the Modern European Constitutions, 1
NAT. L.F. 73, 77 (1956).
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including those that profess constitutional faith, has no room, as 
such, in ‘[m]ost major Western religions.’ Human beings, no matter 
how wise, cannot amend divine law.”376 However, the case of 
constitutional unamendability is different. The authority of the 
eternal principle of, for example, republicanism in France or 
secularism in Turkey, is the same as the authority of the 
constitutional norm making it “eternal”; both derive from a human 
source—the constitutional author representing the people.377
Constitutional eternity goes against modern constitution-making
thinking, building upon the national free will of “we the people,” 
which is considered as sovereign.378 Of course, constitutional eternity 
is selective. It demonstrates what Dietze describes as a nominalistic
recognition of natural law by constituent power: “[O]nly what is 
recognized by the pouvoir constituant as natural law is natural 
law!”379
As Copernicus affected a scientific revolution that shifted 
humanity from its central position in the universe,380 enlightened 
thinkers affected an intellectual revolution that sought to establish 
the human mind as the pivotal point in the universe. Since the 
enlightenment we have seen both the emergence of the “individual” 
and the growth of political theories based on the rational, liberal, and 
law-observing individual. This brings us to the paradox of 
constitutional unamendability. We include in the constitution certain 
unamendable safeguards that would ensure that the people act in a 
rational manner. This, for example, is one of the aims of the 
unamendable protection of secularism, as we learned from the 
jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court. But if individuals 
are indeed rational and responsible, then why do we need these 
safeguards in the first place? Therefore, the picture that we get, as 
376. Oren Gross, Venerate, Amend . . . and Violate, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151, 
1155 (2014). 
377. Weiler, supra note 266, at 8-10.
378. See the famous phrase by Abbé Sieyès: “The nation exists prior to 
everything; it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself.” 
See EMMANUEL-JOSEPH SIEYÈS, What Is the Third Estate?, in EMMANUEL-JOSEPH 
SIEYÈS, POLITICAL WRITINGS 136 (Michael Sonencher ed. & trans., 2003). Of course, 
even for Sieyès, the national will was limited in a way or conditioned by his 
conception of natural law: “Prior to the nation and above the nation, there is only 
natural law.” Id. On the “rise of absolutism” with the rise of the secular political 
realm and in the revolutionary constitution-making era see HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION 145-56 (1977).
379. Dietze, supra note 375, at 88.
380. See, e.g., EDWARD ROSEN, COPERNICUS AND HIS SUCCESSORS (1995). 
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Loughlin correctly writes, is of an individual who “appears 
simultaneously as equal and unequal, rational and irrational, 
responsible and irresponsible.”381
In order to understand the paradoxical move, we need to return 
to Plato’s “noble lie.” Plato was the first political thinker who sought 
a decisive break from the mythical worldview and aimed to construct 
a coherent political theory empty of Gods and spirits: “we are not 
writing stories . . . but founding a state,” he wrote.382 In The 
Republic, he suggested an ideal state in which a very small fraction 
of the citizens will be Philosopher–Rulers who make the key policy 
decisions; another minority group would be the Auxiliaries, who 
enforce these decisions; and the majority of people do not participate 
in the government but focus on the business of everyday life. This 
social hierarchy is founded on an aristocracy of talent. This system 
would be justified by some “magnificent myth” or “noble lie” that 
would convince the entire community, and which is based on the 
following tale: “When God fashioned you, he added gold in the 
composition of those of you who are qualified to be Rulers . . . ; he 
put silver in the Auxiliaries, and iron and bronze in the farmers and 
the rest. . . . [S]ince there is a prophecy that the State will be ruined 
when it has Guardians of silver or bronze,” it is a basic duty of the 
Guardians to exercise care to ensure that children are allocated to 
rank in accordance with their character.383 Therefore, instead of 
eliminating myth from the realm of politics, Plato simply sought to 
replace “the stories in Homer and Hesiod and the poets” with new 
tales: “Our first business is to supervise the production of stories, and 
choose only those we think are suitable.”384 This “noble lie” 
represents the civil religion of the just state.385
A similar process has been at work in the modern era. As Jean-
Pierre Sironneau describes it, the concept of “the sacred,” originating 
in ancient societies and in religious laws, was supposedly 
contradicted in the modern processes and era of secularization in 
modernity. Yet, it had not disappeared but reappeared in new areas 
381. LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 25.
382. LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 24-25 (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 379 
(B. Jowett trans., Penguin Books 1955) (c. 380 B.C.E.)).
383. LOUGHLIN, supra note 309, at 24-25.
384. Id.
385. Benjamine Bilski, Plato’s Political Ontology: On the Nature of Man 
and Regime, in RELIGION, POLICY & LAW 31, 54 (Bart C. Labuschagne & Reinhard 
W. Sonnenschmidt eds., 2009). 
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of human activity, most notably in the political sphere.386 Thus with 
the modern democratic constitution-making age, the ancient 
theological constituent power was transferred from the royal castle to 
the popular sovereign vested in the constitution.387 Just as religion 
cannot stand without a retrospective myth of the creation, the modern 
constitution requires an original constituent power that binds future 
derived powers, inter alia, through the use of eternity clauses.388 But 
as Howard McBain observed in his The Living Constitution, “The 
constitution . . . was not handed down on Mount Sinai by the Lord 
God of Hosts. It is not revealed law . . . It is human means.”389 As a 
product of human design, the constitution should be regarded as 
changeable, not as a document forever—Chukat Olam, like the 
Torah. 
CONCLUSION
To conclude, at a first glance it appears that secularism is a 
non-negotiable principle in states where it is protected in the 
constitution as an eternal principle, above constitutional amending 
powers. 
However, a deeper examination, as conducted with the case 
studies of Turkey, Tajikistan, and Mali, proves otherwise. 
Notwithstanding its prima facie eternal character, the principle of 
secularism remains negotiable in light of the elastic and vague nature 
of the principle. Especially in an increasingly religious society, 
where the constitutional unamendability of secularism goes against 
the Volksgeist, even constitutional eternity would not be able to 
hinder for long true forces in society. As Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde wrote:
[The State] is not a place as an entity that is fixed once and for all, and is 
not independent of individuals and their willingness to integrate into and 
commit to the state. As a unifying actor, the state requires continuous 
386. JEAN-PIERRE SIRONNEAU, SÉCULARISATION ET RELIGIONS POLITIQUES 6
(1982) (Fr.).
387. YOASH MEISLER, CONSTITUTIONALICIST THEOPATHOLOGY 11 (2014) 
(Heb.).
388. Id. at 23.
389. HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION 
OF THE REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW 272 (1927); see also
Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal 
Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 894 
(1993) (“The Constitution . . . is a political document. It may even be a nomos . . . 
But it will not be Torah.”).
330 Michigan State Law Review 2017
affirmation and reproduction in and through the actions of the humans 
who constitute it.390
The idea of a fixed notion once and for all is common in 
religious thinking. A religion is fundamentalist if it takes its own 
truth as absolute, leaving no room for compromise. But what about 
an absolute constitutional entrenchment, which blocks any 
constitutional or democratic avenues for its change? By leaving no 
room for disagreement, constitutional unamendability, even of 
secularism, is fundamentalist in a way.391
And here lies a paradox: If one focuses on the question of 
constitutional eternity, one cannot but be surprised at the fact that 
secularism has, in many contemporary societies, been enshrined as 
an eternal constitutional principle. After all, secularism belongs to 
the realm of immanence, not transcendence.392 The notion of 
something transcendental or eternal conflicts with the idea of 
immanence; therefore the constitutional eternity or unamendability 
of secularism creates an inner contradiction. Indeed, Lacabanne is 
correct in his description, that while secularism was meant to be a 
response to a religious society, and place the idea of the supremacy 
of progress, advancement, and change over immutable principles of a 
time that was considered to have passed, constitution-makers—like 
others before them—wanted to make other concepts and ideas 
eternal. Thus, secularism seems to have replaced religion in the 
definition that Ernest Renan attributed to God—“eternal and 
immutable, without progress or becoming.”393
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Aristotle made a distinction between natural justice—
unchangeable, carries “the same validity everywhere, and does not 
depend on our accepting it or not,” and the validity of positive or 
conventional justice, which depends on the act of human will 
choosing between different alternatives.394 The Gods may have an 
immutable natural justice, but men do not. For us humans, nature 
does not exclude the possibility of change.395
Modern constitutions are about understanding legal authority as 
a human creation formulated in a secular process and enabling such 
process to continue.396 In order to allow secular constitutions to 
continue their secular process, they must, in a way, perpetually 
protect secularism from being abolished. But then again, 
understanding modern constitutions as a human creation rejects any 
notion of eternity and emphasizes the changeable character of secular 
laws. 
The strength of secularism (or any other constitutional claim 
for that matter) is dependent on the general acceptance of its values, 
through a complicated deliberative process that can establish 
political consensus, rather than seeking to demonstrate their eternal 
“truth.” Again, I am not arguing here against the mechanism of 
constitutional eternity or the constitutional protection of secularism. I 
am merely describing its limited effectiveness in certain 
circumstances and pointing to the paradox that lies underneath it. At 
the very least, this Article affirms my previous claim that 
constitutional eternity should not be regarded as eternal but merely 
unamendable in the sense that it limits instituted constitutional 
amendment powers but not the people’s primary constituent 
power.397
Like Plato’s “noble lie” or tale, constitutional eternity is a 
myth. Constitutional eternity is similarly artificial—it is a symbolic 
production, formulated in order to create a certain modern political 
world. 
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